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Introduction
Expectations play a central role in dynamic macroeconomic models. The
standard modelling assumption, originating in the work of Muth (1961) and
tracing back to Lucas’ (1972) and (1976) seminal contributions, is the ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis, which is frequently referred to as a revolution in
macroeconomic thinking for the essential impact it has exerted on economic
research, cf. e.g. Taylor (1999). The key idea is that agents’ expectations
are consistent with the forecast model derived from the underlying economic
structure, implying that they make rational use of their knowledge about eco-
nomic relationships and only incur non–systematic, unavoidable forecast er-
rors. Hence, in the same way that microfounded macro models presuppose
maximizing behavior in agents’ allocations, the rational expectations hypoth-
esis insists on optimal behavior in information processing.
The strong informational requirements of the rational expectations ap-
proach, however, have been subject to criticism, since implementing such fore-
casts requires the knowledge not only of the underlying model but also of
the exact values of all of its parameters. A recent approach that moderates
these strong prerequisites is the theory of adaptive learning. In its basic form
it retains the assumption of agents knowing the equations of the economic
model, but requires them to behave like econometricians to infer estimates of
the model’s parameters.
Adaptive learning thus keeps track of the evolution of agents’ beliefs, i.e.
the set of parameter estimates they base their forecasts on. Given such a
set of estimates, agents can use the model’s forecast equations to project the
future evolution of the relevant variables. The literature has coined the term
“perceived law of motion” to distinguish the agents’ forecast model from the
actual outcomes, which are referred to as the “actual law of motion” implied
by both the economic structure and the process of forming expectations.
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In this context, the concept of rational expectations calls for the consis-
tency of perceptions and actual outcomes. Expectations formulae based on
the agents’ forecast model imply actual economic outcomes. These dynamic
equations shall correspond to the systems perceived by agents, from which
they derived their forecast model. Technically, the economic structure induces
a mapping from perceived onto actual laws of motion, and the rational expec-
tations equilibrium can be defined as a fixed point of this relation.
Much research has been devoted to solve this fixed point problem and the
related problem of uniqueness. Important contributions include Blanchard and
Kahn (1980), Klein (2000) and much of the research of McCallum. This line of
research developed solution methods and elaborated conditions that guarantee
the uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. These conditions can
be translated into policy prescriptions, for example the famous Taylor (1993)
principle that states that only a sufficiently strong interest rate reaction to
inflation on part of a central bank yields a unique equilibrium, precluding the
existence of sunspots and self–fulfilling prophecies.
The adaptive learning approach conjectures that agents continuously ob-
serve their economic environment and use standard econometric procedures
to fine–tune their understanding of dynamic relations. At any given point in
time agents make optimal allocation decisions which crucially depend on their
expectations about future circumstances. To determine the potential evolution
of key variables they dispose only of an approximate model that is subject to
statistical errors. The structural equations links their current perceived law
of motion onto an actual law of motion, and the latter will change unless the
economy has reached the rational expectations equilibrium. During the tran-
sition period, agents accumulate information that is contaminated by their
imperfect knowledge, hence creating a feedback.
A natural question that arises in this context is whether the perceptions
which in general are initially wrong will eventually move to the correct un-
derlying full information equilibrium. If information is initially imperfect, will
the economy nevertheless move towards the full information equilibrium or is
the economic structure such that initial deviations from this state will accu-
mulate and drive the system further apart from it? The work of Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) provides the necessary theoretical background to analyze
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this convergence issue, known as E–stability, and opens a fruitful strand of
research. Correspondingly, much work has been devoted to derive conditions
on policy that assure E–stability,
Adaptive learning can isolate a unique equilibrium in a multiple equilib-
rium setup that is characterized by stability properties in the process of self–
referential data accumulation, and is therefore often seen as an equilibrium
selection device. The rational expectations theory cannot explain the transi-
tion from a prevailing equilibrium to a new one once structural factors have
changed; instead it implies an immediate adaption to the new state without
explaining how and whether the economy will get there. Adaptive learning
provides this missing link in explicitly accounting for this transition period.
This new approach is, however, also capable of explaining many empirical
phenomena. If the economic structure remains constant, rational expectations
theory implies that the actual law of motion remains constant as well, while
the information accumulation process, reflected in ever updating perceived
laws of motion, will necessarily introduce time variation into actual economic
dynamics. Hence, even if a theoretical model covers sufficient phenomena to
imply a time invariant structure, we will nevertheless observe time variation
over the course of learning the precise working of the model. Consequently,
changes in econometric estimates (e.g. even changes in policy, see chapter 1)
that are usually interpreted as exogenous changes in the structure that cannot
be explained by the model can potentially be endogenized using the adaptive
learning approach. Another empirical phenomenon that is well documented in
the empirical literature is the decline in shock volatility, in a certain context
referred to as the great moderation. If learning dynamics contribute to the
model while at the same time fading out over time due to E–stability, this
channel will initially inject additional variance into macro variables that will
eventually clear out. Without learning taken into account the related reduction
in variance must be traced back to a reduction in the variances of the shock
term, leading to the interpretation of economic disturbances having become
more favorable without being able to explain this phenomenon.
Surprisingly, though, there has not been much research devoted to the
question of empirical relevance. After all, adaptive learning would matter
little if its quantitative importance would be limited. The goal of this thesis is
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to provide empirical evidence on this approach and to demonstrate its power
in accounting for otherwise hardly explainable phenomena.
There are two channels that inject additional dynamics into an economic
system under adaptive learning. The first is the effect of frequent model re-
visions on optimal policy decisions. As soon as new information arrives the
policymaker will reconsider the way he uses his instruments to influence his
target variables. With a new transition law the optimal trade off between vari-
ables changes due to modified dynamic relations. This effect has recently been
investigated by Primiceri (2006) in a model of US inflation and unemployment
dynamics to study the impact of learning on the federal funds rate. Assuming
that policy was conducted optimally he shows that the inflationary outbreak
as experienced in the US during the great inflation episode during the seventies
and early eighties can be traced back to learning related dynamics.
In chapter 1 we apply a similar method to both US and UK data and pur-
sue the question which interest rates an optimizing policymaker would have
set if he had been subject to imperfect information. We combine Primiceri’s
investigation of the Great Inflation using the adaptive learning approach with
Orphanides’ work on the importance of mismeasurements in unobservable vari-
ables such as output or unemployment gaps. We depart from the standard
single equation approach to model the latent natural rate of unemployment
and implement an appropriate signal extraction method to determine it. The
advantage of this procedure is that it yields real–time estimates of the natural
rate that are in line with narrative evidence and, unlike the standard method,
can be equally applied to different data sets. We challenge Primiceri’s assump-
tion that policy was conducted optimally, which appears questionable at least
in face of the tremendous outbreak of inflation in the United Kingdom in the
seventies. Instead we compute the interest rate paths optimizing policymakers
would have set had they been subject to imperfect information, and contrast
them with historical rates. We find that historical and optimally recommended
rates are highly correlated, but that during the great inflation historical rates
were set moderately relative to what optimality considerations under certainty
equivalence would have implied.
Chapter 2 picks up this idea and brings Brainard’s (1967) uncertainty result
into the analysis. Our primary question is whether outcomes as experienced
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in the US and the UK during the great inflation can be attributed to learn-
ing dynamics. We simulate inflation–unemployment dynamics as estimated
from time series data given an optimizing policymaker subject to imperfect
information. Again, we do not focus on a single type of policymaker, as char-
acterized by a set of preference parameters, but investigate which outcome
would have been experienced by different preferences. We discuss that a com-
bination of wrong perceptions of inflation persistence and the Phillips curve
slope, that measures the extend to which real activity impacts on changes in
the price level, together with a substantial measurement error regarding the
natural level of unemployment inevitably pushed the economy into a high in-
flation era. Our simulations demonstrate that this is the most likely outcome,
with probabilities of it occurring almost reaching a hundred percent, while on
the contrary without learning these high inflation episodes would rarely occur,
and even if they did, they would not last as long and would not reach the high
levels that we observe in the data. In fact, our learning model replicates the
stylized facts encountered in the data, including the outbreak of high inflation,
the fact that the peaks of the unemployment gap lag those of inflation a few
quarters, and the rapid disinflation. We also find that the characteristics of
the aforementioned combination of beliefs evolve quite naturally in our learn-
ing models. Despite our simulations generating episodes comparable to the
great inflation, the extremely high inflation rates–in particular in the UK–are
rarely attained in our simulations. Following the idea that the time varying
uncertainty surrounding consecutive estimates might be the source of this be-
havior, we conduct a counterfactual exercise in the spirit of Brainard. We find
that a learning policymaker who obliges himself to a mute response in face of
high uncertainty would induce inflation episodes matching those historically
observed in size and duration.
The second channel received more attention in the literature and relates
to the impact of learning on expectations and the related feedback. Given the
immense interest in the estimation of dynamic stochastic equilibrium (DSGE)
models, chapter 3 develops a method that allows researchers to replace the
assumption of rational expectations with that of real–time expectations. The
procedure allows to estimate general DSGE models under the alternative as-
sumption of adaptive learning and thus contributes to the literature in that it
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allows to keep track of the dynamic interaction of actual dynamic equations
and the perceived law of motion. We apply this method in Ireland’s (2004)
variant of the New Keynesian model that assesses the role of real–business
type technology shocks. Interestingly, we find that the estimation of his model
under adaptive learning not only gives a better fit to the data, but also yields
substantially different results. This shows that ignoring learning dynamics in
the estimation introduces a substantial bias in the remaining estimates.
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CHAPTER 1
Optimal Monetary Policy under Learning:
An Empirical Approach
1.1. Introduction
Most modern macroeconomic models are characterized by forward looking
behavior. The standard assumption on expectations formation is the ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis, requiring agents to build forecasts consistently
within the economic model. While this is a very satisfying assumption in view
of microfounded optimizing behavior it is often criticized for its strong infor-
mational assumptions. Apart from the behavioral equations, agents must have
perfect knowledge of aggregate dynamics which is in conflict with econometric
practice. Adaptive learning (AL), advanced by Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
is a recent approach to attenuate this assumption in that it assumes imperfect
information and requires agents to infer precise knowledge of macroeconomic
relations by real–time data observation.
In a New Keynesian model agents not only behave optimally in making
their allocation and pricing decisions but also in the way they form their ex-
pectations. Many studies question whether the policymaker behaved optimally
in that framework during the 1970s and find that a change in policy preferences
or a change in the way policy is conducted led to the low inflation environment
that we experience since the successful completion of the Volcker disinflation,
see e.g. Clarida et al. (2000).
The adaptive learning approach attributes the bad performance to addi-
tional dynamics due to imperfect knowledge and the evolution of decision mak-
ers’ beliefs. Since the Great Inflation was present not only in the US, it appears
debatable whether the change in the Fed’s chairmanship in 1979 could be the
cause of the improved performance. Thus AL offers a unified approach to
answer this question not only for the US but also for other countries with a
qualitatively similar inflation history such as the UK.
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Primiceri (2006) applies this methodology and investigates whether the
high inflation episode of the 1970s and early 1980s is consistent with an op-
timizing policymaker who is exposed to imperfect information, and due to
his restricted information set brings inflation to very high levels and for a
prolonged period despite his best efforts. In particular he shows that the infla-
tionary outbreaks would have equally well occurred under an optimizing policy
regime that is exposed to imperfect information about the economic structure.
Primiceri’s method starts from the conjecture that US monetary policy was
at least close to optimal behavior under learning, but this assumption is not
examined explicitly. It is hard to verify whether the policy was conducted non–
optimally when the opposite is assumed from the outset. Although Primiceri
demonstrates that a Great Inflation is possible even in case the central bank
behaves optimally, his approach clearly cannot answer this question. More-
over, given the extremely high inflation in the UK in that episode it appears
questionable whether this is indeed consistent with historical rates. Hence in
this paper we challenge this assumption and fill this gap by investigating how
a learning policy maker would have optimally conducted policy before, during,
and following the Great Inflation under imperfect information.
We follow Primiceri and analyze optimal policy in a small empirical macro
model similar in spirit to Woodford’s (2003) New Keynesian model, adjusted
to fit it to US and UK time series. The policymaker is assumed to face a stan-
dard quadratic loss function allowing for an inflation bias, but he has to infer
information about the model’s dynamics by real time data observation. While
Primiceri investigates a single type of policymaker characterized by preferences
that most closely describe historical rates in terms of optimal outcomes, we
will derive the paths for nominal interest rates for a broad range of policy
preferences and compare the resulting interest rate decisions with historical
rates.
We will investigate whether policy as pursued in the last 20 years that is
commonly classified as appropriate differs from previous policy behavior or
whether the same outcomes would result even without changes in preferences.
We will see that changes in preferences play only a minor role and are not the
source of the superior inflation outcomes of the last two decades. We find a
dominant role of imperfect information, in particular in the mismeasurement
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of the non–accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, as also documented
by Orphanides and van Norden (2002), but also in the perception of inflation
persistence and the Phillips curve slope as well as the uncertainty surrounding
the corresponding estimates, as suggested by Brainard’s (1967) study.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the historical
performance of inflation and unemployment in the US and the UK, with par-
ticular focus on the Great Inflation episodes. Section 1.3 introduces the model
and the adaptive learning approach while section 1.4 is devoted to optimal
policy behavior in this context and discusses commonly assumed policy pref-
erences underlying optimal decision making. Section 1.5 presents our results
on interest paths of an optimizing learning central banker and contrasts his
decisions with historical interest rates. Section 1.6 investigates the robustness
of our findings to variations in the benchmark setting, and finally section 1.7
concludes.
1.2. Stylized Facts
The term Great Inflation (GI) refers to the prolonged high inflation pe-
riod experienced in the United States, and similarly in other industrialized
countries, for almost twenty years. Beginning in the mid–sixties, US inflation
gradually increased, peaking at double digit levels in the mid–seventies and re-
mained high for a sustained period, until it finally returned to low levels under
Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker. This rapid decline in the early eighties
is now referred to as Volcker Disinflation. A large amount of research has been
conducted to explain this episode, but until now it seems difficult to explain
all relevant empirical facts consistently in a model. This introduction gives a
brief description of these facts and reviews some representative explanations
that have been advanced in the literature.
Figure 1.1 (top panel) plots annualized quarterly inflation and the un-
employment rate for US data. Beginning in the 1960s, inflation gradually
increased, reaching a maximum of 12 percent in 1974. Although it decreased
for a while, it remained high on average and peaked again above 10 percent by
the end of 1980. This second peak was followed by a sharp disinflation, which
quickly brought the inflation rate below 4 percent within two years and to an
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Figure 1.1: US (top panel) and UK (bottom panel) time series of inflation
(thick line) and unemployment.
average level of 2.5 percent thereafter. Unemployment lags inflation, peaking
one year and two years, respectively, after inflation.
Inspection of figure 1.1 (bottom panel) reveals that the situation in the
United Kingdom was qualitatively similar to the US case discussed above,
though it was far more severe. We observe slowly but continuously increasing
inflation in the beginning of the sample, until inflation peaked at 26.6 percent
in the second quarter of 1975. Although the economy briefly recovered, infla-
tion remained high, peaked again five years later at 22 percent, until it finally
dropped rapidly to levels below five percent, where it remained afterwards,
except for 1987 and the following years where it temporarily touched eight
percent. This rapid decline was followed by a prolonged period of unemploy-
ment that ceased only several quarters until inflation reached low levels. We
also observe this phenomenon of a disinflation leading unemployment peaks
in the periods following the inflationary years 1987–1992. To summarize, we
observe UK inflation continually rising until it reached its peak level in the
mid–seventies, and remaining at high levels for several years. The UK econ-
omy experienced a rapid disinflation in the early eighties, which was followed
by an upshot of unemployment. Hence, the stylized facts discussed for the US
were experienced in the UK economy as well.
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1.3. The Model and Adaptive Learning
The adaptive learning literature typically analyzes related questions in a
version of Woodford’s (2003) DSGE model, see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) or Bullard and Mitra (2002) for prominent examples. This model con-
sists of the New–Keynesian Phillips curve
(1.1) pit = αfEtpit+1 + θxt−1 + εt
and an IS type aggregate demand equation relating a measure of real activity
x to its future expected values, a policy instrument r, and a shock term ηt,
(1.2) xt = Etxt+1 + λrt + ηt
Equation (1.1) is a pricing equation based on the Calvo (1983) model. In
this model a random fraction ω of price setters is allowed to reoptimize their
individual prices. The variable x is identified with real marginal costs, but
in empirical work it is commonly approximated by either the output gap,
e.g. Smets (2002), that is the deviation of real output from its flexible price
benchmark, or by the unemployment gap, e.g. Primiceri (2006), the deviation
of current unemployment from the rate which puts no pressure on the inflation
rate. Orphanides and Williams (2007) emphasize that the unemployment gap
xt and the output gap x
o
t are related by a proportional relation known as
Okun’s (1962) law.
Equation (1.2) is a log–linearized Euler equation that results from agents’
utility maximizing behavior in a representative agent model with monopolistic
competition in the goods market. r is the ex ante real interest rate, relating
to the central bank’s policy instrument i, the nominal interest rate, via the
Fisher equation rt = it − Etpit+1.
All coefficients are functions of deeper behavioral or preference parameters,
though we shall not be interested in this relation. What is important for our
approach is the dynamic law that the central banker perceives when thinking
about an appropriate path for his policy instrument.
Typically these microfounded equations are modified by including addi-
tional lag terms of the endogenous variables, to capture dynamics present in
the data but not accounted for by the stylized model (1.1) and (1.2); see Fuhrer
and Moore (1995). If the data favors the more restrictive theoretical model,
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these parameters would be estimated to be zero, thus nesting the underly-
ing model. Ireland (2004) proposes a similar procedure. There is currently a
debate in the adaptive learning literature, whether empirically measured in-
flation persistence is structural, as suggested by Fuhrer and Moore’s hybrid
specification with non–zero parameter estimates of the backward components,
or whether learning dynamics account for at least part of it, making the back-
ward looking term redundant. Thus, the burden to explain persistence is
shifted from structural factors to learning related dynamics, see Milani (2005)
and Junker (2008).
For our analysis of optimal monetary policy we prefer a reduced form sys-
tem which is more in line with empirical macro models, given by
pit = α(L)pit−1 + θ(L)xt + εpit(1.3)
xt = ρ(L)xt−1 + λrt−1 + εxt(1.4)
where we use a lag order of two for the autoregressive polynomials α(·), θ(·)
and ρ(·) thus obtaining a model identical to that used in Primiceri (2006)
and similar to Rudebusch and Svensson’s (1998) and Smets’s (2002) models.
Following Rudebusch and Svensson and Smets we compute the real rate as
rt = it − p¯it, where our measure of expected inflation is a four quarter moving
average of current and past inflation rates.
The timing assumption in these models, as in our equations (1.3) and
(1.4), implies that monetary policy affects real activity with a one period lag
and the unemployment gap in turn has an impact on inflation one quarter
ahead. Overall, monetary policy affects inflation with a two quarter lag. This
is consistent with the dynamics of the monetary transmission mechanism as
documented by Christiano et al. (1999), and allows us to solve for optimal
monetary policy using standard methods, as explained below.
The advantage of using an empirical reduced form specification is that
we can focus on the behavior of a learning policymaker while suppressing
the expectations channel. Such a reduced form can be obtained by modelling
expectations as sufficiently backward looking, adaptive processes. Models that
emphasize the connection between structural and reduced form are subject to
chapter 3 and Junker (2008). It would be an ambitious goal to analyze the
structural model, using two–sided learning. This is left for future research.
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It should be noted, however, that two–sided learning is substantially more
complex and is rarely applied in the AL literature, mostly in calibrated models
of the economy. We interpret our specification as a tractable reduced form
version of the standard DSGE model.
Perceived Law of Motion. We equip the policymaker with a dynamic
model of inflation and unemployment of the form discussed previously, so that
he faces the equations
pit = cˆpi + αˆ1pit−1 + αˆ2pit−2 + θˆ1xt|t−1 + θˆ2xt|t−2 + εpit(1.5)
xt = cˆx + ρˆ1xt|t−1 + ρˆ2xt|t−2 + λ(it−1 − p¯it−1) + εxt(1.6)
where constants have been added so that the model can be estimated using
historical data series, in contrast to the theoretical model which is formulated
in terms of deviations from steady state values which are usually unknown.
This specification is referred to as perceived law of motion, since it speci-
fies the model underlying the policymaker’s decisions given his perception of
the economic environment, which does not necessarily coincide with the true
data generating process. Our main assumption is that the central banker has
imperfect information about the model’s dynamics and he will use statisti-
cal inference to update his beliefs, which will crucially drive his optimality
decisions.
The key assumption of adaptive learning is imperfect knowledge of decision
makers. The central banker is assumed to know the functional form of equa-
tions (1.5) and (1.6), but he lacks information regarding the parameter values.
He thus uses statistical inference to improve his estimates of the autoregressive
parameters, the Phillips Curve slope parameters, and the constants over time,
which we collect in the belief vector
(1.7) βt = (cˆpi,t, αˆ1,t, αˆ2,t, θˆ1,t, θˆ2,t, cx,s, ρˆ1,t, ρˆ2,t)
′
where the index t refers to the information set upon which the estimator is
based. The date–t information set includes It = {pis, us, rs−1}s≤t, which im-
plicitly includes the unemployment gap since it is a function of observable
variables included in the information set.
The impact coefficient λ is difficult to estimate over the whole set of sub-
samples. We will see below, when discussing the standard deviations of the
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estimates over time, that during particular periods the precision of estimates
is rather poor; in particular the estimates of λ are insignificant for many sub-
samples and even display the wrong sign occasionally. We believe that it is
plausible that central bankers at least agree on the sign of this parameter and
prefer to calibrate this coefficient on a standard value.
It is a rather common phenomenon in the adaptive learning literature that
the same parsimonious model is not capable of giving a satisfactory fit for
all subsamples, and for this reason, many applications focus on simple models,
allowing learning of only one or a small subset of parameters of central interest
while calibrating the remaining coefficients. We will nevertheless estimate all
dynamic parameters, as indicated by the belief vector β.
Primiceri also implicitly fixed this parameter on a value λ = 0.024, while
other studies find somewhat larger values, albeit usually relating to the output
gap. If we follow Orphanides and Williams’s suggestion in choosing an Okun
coefficient of (minus) 2, we can translate estimated or calibrated impact coef-
ficients from an output gap equation into corresponding impact coefficient for
our unemployment gap equation (1.6). In this regard, we find values ranging
from λ = 0.05 (cf. Rudebusch and Svensson (1998)), λ = 0.025 and λ = 0.03
(for different subsamples in Smets (2002)). We will also consider somewhat
larger values and extend the range to allow for values above Rudebusch and
Svensson’s estimate. Consequently, we will consider λ ∈ [0.024, 0.08] as the
relevant range, choose the midpoint as benchmark value, which corresponds to
Rudebusch and Svensson’s estimate, and consider variations in the full range in
a separate sensitivity analysis. Our robustness check confirms that the precise
value of the impact coefficient does not affect our results qualitatively.
Nairu as a latent variable. Our model features a time–varying rate of
unemployment which is thought of as the level that exerts no pressure on the
inflation rate. With a slight abuse of (technical) language, this particular rate is
commonly referred to as the non–accelerating inflation rate of unemployment,
or Nairu for short, since it is the rate that induces no movement of inflation,
cf. e.g. Ball and Mankiw (2002) or Gordon (1997). The unemployment gap
is the difference between the current unemployment rate and the prevailing
Nairu, hence the latter is formally given by the level of unemployment for
which the unemployment gap in equation (1.3) vanishes. Importantly, in the
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present context, at date s the policymaker also updates the whole path of
his perceived Nairu given a new data observation, yielding the series {u∗t|s}s≤t
where u∗t|s is the date–t estimate of the Nairu level prevailing at date s. So
before we can proceed with describing the policymakers learning algorithm,
we have to discuss how he infers the latent variable x from the data.
Note that the gap is determined by contrasting the level of the correspond-
ing date’s unemployment rate to the Nairu as perceived by the policymaker
at the current date t. Since this is also an estimate, it generally differs from
its true level, hence the policymaker does not only face uncertainty about the
model’s true parameter values, but is also subject to misperceptions of one of
its main target variables. This last point is the crucial feature in Orphanides’
work. He analyzes the effect of real time and ’quasi–real time’ data, the latter
being the effect present in our approach; in Orphanides and van Norden (2002)
both effects are shown to be substantial.
At this point it is worth discussing how related papers handle the issue of
Nairu estimation in a learning environment. Orphanides and Williams (2007)
note that given the time variation in the Nairu policymakers need to contin-
uously reestimate this variable in quasi–real time. As a simplifying approach
he suggests the use of a simple algorithm which basically extracts the Nairu as
a recursive sample mean of unemployment, though the application of a con-
stant gain approach additionally involves a discounting of past observations
(see the related discussion below). Primiceri (2006) adopts this procedure and
calibrates the learning gain such that the resulting series is broadly consistent
with conventional wisdom regarding the Nairu path. This procedure works ap-
proximately for US data where the Nairu is regarded as a very smooth series
with small fluctuations around the mean unemployment level of six percent.
Applying this method to UK data would produce a Nairu path that continu-
ally underestimates the path relative to conventional empirical estimates which
display higher fluctuations than the US counterpart. To avoid this problem
we will employ a more sophisticated method that is designed to extract a unit
root latent variable from observable data.
Standard methods to extract trends are Kalman’s (1960) Filter (cf. Gordon
(1997) for an application to US data, Franz (2005) for German data and Batini
and Greenslade (2006) for UK data, or for the case where the excess demand
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term is measured by the output gap, see Smets (2002)), and the Hodrick–
Prescott Filter (see Hodrick and Prescott (1997); henceforth HP). The Kalman
Filter simultaneously estimates the path of the Nairu and the parameters of
the model. Application of the HP Filter proceeds in two steps. The filter
is appropriate to identify the unit root trend component of unemployment,
and the resulting difference to the unemployment series is subsequently used
as a regressor in either ordinary least squares regression or a commonly used
version of it as discussed below.
For simulations in connection with adaptive learning it is advisable to
choose Hodrick and Prescott’s method since it is substantially faster and,
more importantly, numerically more reliable than the Kalman Filter approach.1
However, both methods yield very similar results. In fact, the arbitrary choice
of the HP–smoothness parameter is made as to assure that the resulting series
for the Nairu is in line with previous studies, as will be discussed below. The
choice of this parameter and the robustness of the results against changes in
this parameter are the subject of section 1.6. For an application of the Kalman
Filter to extract the gap variable, see chapter 3 and Junker (2008).
Learning Algorithms. After deriving u∗t , the policymaker computes the
perceived unemployment gap xt = ut − u∗t and applies appropriate estimation
techniques to the pricing and demand equation, yielding a revised estimate βt.
A common approach in the learning literature, suggested for example by
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and applied in important contributions, e.g. in
Bullard and Eusepi (2005) or Cho et al. (2002), are the so–called constant gain
learning algorithms. They are favored over related methods such as ordinary
least squares since its discounting of past data reflects the desire of agents to
keep track of regime breaks. In particular in face of models under learning,
where feedback effects usually affect the dynamic evolution this appears as a
plausible procedure.
Related work, such as those cited above, typically present a recursive for-
mulation of the learning algorithm, which integrates the last observation into
1Maximum likelihood estimation using the Kalman Filter requires numerical optimiza-
tion of the same model for an increasing sequence of data points; usually additional assump-
tions regarding initialization or variances are made depending on the outcome of the filter.
This procedure is not advisable for simulations.
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the previous estimate. This formulation is convenient since it offers a com-
putationally fast updating procedure for a growing sample. However, in face
of latent variables this procedure in inappropriate. Each time the model is
reestimated for an increased sample the whole regressor based on the unob-
servable component will change, so that the recursive procedure would ignore
the improved estimate of the path except for the most recent realization. Thus
it should be noted that recursive and ordinary least squares are not equivalent
once we determine a latent variable in a first step.
It is nevertheless illustrative to consider the standard recursive learning
algorithm for a single equation regression of y on x,
βt = βt−1 + γtΣ−1t xt(yt − x′tβt−1)(1.8)
Σt = Σt−1 + γt(xtx′t − Σt−1)(1.9)
where Σt is the date–t estimate of the covariance matrix of the OLS estima-
tor. The estimate βt for a sample ending in period t can be computed from
the previous estimate from the sample ending in t − 1 and the most recent
observations (yt, xt). The estimate is adjusted by a weighted forecast error
from the previous regression. The factor γt, referred to as gain parameter,
plays a key role: for γt = 1/t we have a recursive formulation of ordinary least
squares where the same weight is attached to each observation. Constant gain
algorithms differ from least squares in replacing this time varying gain by a
constant gain γt = γ for all t. Further details are provided in appendix A.1.
To be able to use a constant gain algorithm even in face of the latent unem-
ployment gap and thus enabling us to relate our results to similar studies using
particular values for the gain parameter, we will use discounted least squares
(DLS). As also discussed in appendix A.1, this is the non recursive counterpart
to constant gain algorithms, with gain and the corresponding discount factor
being related as
(1.10) γ =
√
1− δ2
In this formulation a zero gain corresponds to the borderline case of a unit
discount factor, in which case DLS coincides with ordinary least squares (OLS),
so using gain values within a standard range while explicitly allowing for the
case γ = 0 nests OLS as a special case. As an example, the widespread
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calibration for the gain value γ = 0.03 is associated with a discount factor of
δ = 0.985.
At date t the policymaker will thus proceed as follows: firstly, he revises his
estimated Nairu path, {u∗t|s}s≤t, and deduces the perceived unemployment gap
for all dates, {xt|s}s≤t. If he wants to use a gain such as our benchmark value
γ0 he uses equation (1.10) to solve for the corresponding discount factor δ,
discounts all regressors and endogenous variables with this factor and applies
OLS to the transformed system. For δ < 1 this method is DLS. The param-
eter estimates derived in this way will then be mapped onto an appropriate
state space form to revise his optimality problem within his updated dynamic
transition law of the economy, as discussed in the next section.
Learning results. The following figures track the evolution of the policy-
maker’s beliefs of the corresponding parameters over time. While all samples
start in 1955 and 1959, resp., depending on data availability, the time axis
depicts the final sample point which is also the estimation date, e.g. in figure
1.2, the value of approximately 0.5 in 1964 indicates that inflation persistence
was estimated at that level at that time while 16 years later, in 1980, inflation
was perceived to be substantially less stationary with a value close to unity.
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Figure 1.2: Beliefs of Inflation Persistence
Beliefs of Inflation Persistence. Both the evolution of beliefs about US and
about UK inflation persistence share close similarities. Initially policymakers
regard inflation as a strongly mean reverting process with an autoregressive
parameter of around 0.3 and 0.5 implying quick return to the target level after
occurrence of shocks. This view drastically changes in the seventies when
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updated parameter estimates indicate that inflation is in fact close to a unit
root process.
US model UK model
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Figure 1.3: Beliefs of the Phillips curve slope
Beliefs of the Phillips curve slope. The evolution of the beliefs about the
Phillips curve slope are similar in both models. Initially, the slope has a
substantial, negative value that is continually eroded until it reaches zero in
the early seventies. This means that the sacrifice ratio, that is the units of
unemployment above the Nairu necessary to induce a desired effect on inflation
is bit by bit increased. After the effectiveness almost completely vanished, the
perceived slope improves in favor of active policy making, taking on higher and
higher values (in absolute terms) until it reaches a level of maximum efficiency
around 1980, somewhat later in the US, and a few quarters earlier in the UK.
Afterwards, the slope coefficient slowly approaches values close to zero. This
observation is consistent with the findings in Primiceri (2006). Using different
price measures, other studies find even more pronounced changes in perceived
persistence though they agree qualitatively with our results, cf. Milani (2005).
The amplitude of the UK slope perceptions is higher since the higher as-
sumed time variability of the Nairu soaks up a great part of the unemployment
fluctuations resulting in a lower gap amplitude. Ceteris paribus, a lower am-
plitude of the estimated unemployment gap yields higher parameter estimates
for the slope. It is the product of these two which can be inferred from the
data, the separation in gap and slope multiplier depends on the assumptions
regarding the Nairu smoothness.
Full sample and quasi–real time Nairu. Figure 1.4 plots the unemployment
rate, the full sample Nairu estimate (dashed line) and the quasi–real time
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Figure 1.4: Full sample Nairu (dashed line), quasi–real time Nairu (thick line)
and revision intervals (shaded region)
Nairu. The latter is defined pointwise, its date t value giving the perception
of the Nairu as of time t, i.e. formally u∗t|t, whereas in contrast the full sample
Nairu plots the date T perception of the Nairu level at any date within the
sample, i.e. its date t value is u∗T |t. The concept of a (quasi–)real time Nairu is
frequently employed by Orphanides, e.g. in Orphanides and Williams (2005).
Comparing our US quasi–real time Nairu with the corresponding one in the
latter paper, we find that both paths are very similar, although our Nairu
has a higher amplitude in the years after 1981. The full sample Nairu is
a smooth series and is comparable to results in other empirical studies, cf.
Gordon (1997) for an example. The difference between both series gives the
real time misperception of the latest Nairu values, that is in the early 1970s
the perceived values of the Nairu prevailing at that time was slightly above 4
percent while current estimates for these values are substantially higher, being
around 6 percent as is also implied by our full sample estimates.
1.4. Optimal Policy under Adaptive Learning
We will impose a quadratic loss function for the central banker which apart
from the incorporation of a potential inflation bias is standard in the literature.
Optimal monetary policy will be a feedback rule that is derived from this un-
derlying loss function. We will discuss the policymakers optimization problem,
investigate the effect of adaptive learning on these decision and consider the
relevant range for the preference parameters in the final part of this section.
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The Optimal Linear Regulator Problem. At any date t the policy-
maker chooses a path for its instrument v to minimize the discounted stream∑
s≥t δ
s−tLs of current and expected future period losses, which are given by
(1.11) Ls = (pis − pi∗)2 + ωu(us − kuˆ∗t|s)2 + ων(vs − vs−1)2, s = t, t+ 1, . . .
The loss function is quadratic in deviations of inflation pi from a target rate
pi∗, in the unemployment gap u − u∗ and in the rate of change of the policy
instrument. The standard quadratic term in the unemployment gap is modified
to allow for an inflationary bias of the central banker towards the real side of
the economy, that is towards unemployment. Instead of subtracting the Nairu
from the level of unemployment, we subtract κuˆ∗t to obtain the standard case
for κ = 1, and an increasing tendency to allow for an inflationary bias in favor
of unemployment rates being below the Nairu as κ approaches zero.
The change in the policy instrument is taken account of to reflect the
degree of interest rate inertia typically found in empirical studies, which is
not implied by the model. However, studies usually find an extremely large
response of interest rates towards deviations of inflation or unemployment from
their respective target values, unless the smoothing objective is explicitly taken
account of. We normalize the weight on inflation deviations to one, so that
the parameters ωu and ων are relative weights.
The policy maker faces a dynamic transition law given by equations (1.5)
and (1.6), which is linear in the state vector yt = (1, pit, pit−1, pit−2, pit−3, ut, u∗t ,
ut−1, u∗t−1, vt−1)
′. The policymaker’s dynamic program can be reformulated as
a linear–quadratic optimal regulator problem of choosing a path for the policy
instrument v that minimizes the quadratic loss function
(1.12)
∑
t≥s
δt−s[y′tΩyyyt + v
′
tΩvvvt + 2y
′
tΩyvvt] ≡
∑
t≥s
δt−s(y′t, vt)Ω(y
′
t, vt)
′
subject to the perceived linear transition law
(1.13) yt+1 = Ayt +Bvt + εt+1,
with a singular weight matrix Ω, and system matrices A and B. The singularity
of the matrix can be addressed by the invariant subspace method using the
generalized Schur decomposition, as discussed e.g. in Hansen and Sargent
(2005). The procedure requires transformations to eliminate discounting and
the presence of mixed terms. Discussion of this method along with details on
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the matrices are deferred to appendices A.3 and A.2. The resulting optimal
policy depends on the policymakers preference parameter p to be discussed
in detail below, which comprises his discount factor, the inflation target, the
inflationary bias parameter and the weights in the loss function. The solution
can be expressed as a linear feedback rule
(1.14) vt = −Fyt
where the elements of the row vector F are computed numerically using the
procedure proposed by Hansen and Sargent.
Combining Learning and Optimal Policy. Inserting an optimal policy
reaction function as described in equation (1.14) into equation (1.13) yields the
implied optimal dynamic behavior of the system, given by
(1.15) yt = (A−BF )yt−1 + εt
that the policymaker expects in the absence of shocks. As is standard, the
corresponding path for the instrument will only be implemented in expectation.
Upon arrival of new information, i.e. the realization of shocks, this path will
be adjusted. The feedback rule on the other hand usually stays invariant and
is designed to accommodate the impact of shocks. In particular, this means
that the system evolves according to the same dynamics, in the sense of having
the same eigenvalues and thus adjustment speeds, though from different initial
values that depend on the shock realizations.
Under learning, however, also the feedback rule, given by the vector F
changes each period. New data does not only include (at least approximate)
observations of shocks as under RE, but it also supplies valuable informa-
tion about the unknown parameters of the dynamic transition law, and con-
sequently also calls for a readjustment of the rule itself. The policymaker
applies his learning algorithm to equations (1.5) and (1.6) each quarter as new
information arrives. This gives him an updated linear transition law of the
form
(1.16) yt+1 = Atyt +Btvt + εt+1
where the matrices A and B are now indexed by t, the time the estimation is
conducted.
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It has become standard in the literature on adaptive learning to follow
Kreps (1998) in assuming what he calls Anticipated Utility. This stands for
the assumption that the policymaker treats the dynamic system (1.16) as time
invariant and solves the corresponding optimal regulator problem without ac-
counting for potential future adjustments in the system matrices. We interpret
this as follows: the underlying parameters are regarded as constant while fine–
tuning gives improved estimates each period. Thus even if he is continually
reassured that the parameters differ from period to period, the policymaker
does not attribute these changes to a changes in the model but to more precise
understanding of the latter. Cogley and Sargent (2001) revisit this assump-
tion, provide evidence that this is a valid simplification in our environment
and promote its use to keep the analysis tractable. We thus obtain a linear
feedback rule responding to the state vector y,
(1.17) vt = −F (p, βt)yt
where the notation emphasizes the dependence of the feedback rule on both
date–t beliefs βt and the preference vector p that governs the decision problem.
To summarize, at any date t the policymaker with fixed preferences p ob-
served data up to this date, his information set thus being It = {pis, us, is}s≤t,
which implicitly includes unemployment gap since it is a function of observ-
able variables included in the information set. He derives an estimated path
of the unemployment gap and applies a non–recursive learning algorithm as
discussed above yielding updated perceptions βt. He solves the corresponding
optimal regulator problem, obtaining an optimal path {−F (p, βt) Etys}s≥t,
from which he implements the first prescribed policy move in the current pe-
riod. Economic variables realize and the policymaker repeats these steps in the
following period. Eventually, this yields a sequence of implemented optimal
policy decisions, {−F (p, βt)yt}t=1,...,T . It depends on the policymaker’s pref-
erence parameters, that is his inflation target, the inflationary bias parameter
and the weights in the loss function, collected in the preference vector p, which
the next section discusses in detail.
Policy Preferences. We want to investigate how a standard policymaker
will set policy in the economies described by our sequential estimates of US
and UK dynamics. We thus pose the question of what interest rates would
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have been set at a given date t assuming that the policymaker behaved opti-
mally given his most recent model estimates. Since this decision depends on
the central banker’s preferences we investigate a range of preferences that we
consider relevant for policy making. We randomly draw a policy preference
vector p using the uniform distribution over plausible intervals usually sup-
ported by the literature. Recalling that policy preferences are summarized by
a vector p = (κ, ωx, ωv)
′, we have to discuss plausible ranges for each of these
parameters from which we will make uniformly random draws.
For the central banker’s inflation target we choose a benchmark value of
pi∗0 = 2 which is a common value, cf. e.g. Bullard and Eusepi (2005) and
Schorfheide (2005). Our main simulation in the next section allows for values
in the range pi∗ ∈ [1.5, 4].
We observe that the inflation bias parameter is constrained to the unit
interval and predispose that very low values are not very likely. Given Prim-
iceri’s finding that the inflation bias is quantitatively negligible we consider
the range κ ∈ [0.5, 1] in our main part and choose his estimate κ0 = 0.87 as
benchmark.
Reasonable benchmark values for the relative weights in the loss function
are ωu = ωv = 1 since this choice implies that all target values are equally
important. It appears plausible, however, to allow each of the three variables
to be a dominant target for monetary policy, so that relative weights above
one should be regarded in the same way as their inverses, being below one. We
choose a range of [1/2, 2] for both weights implying that we consider central
bankers with inflation aversion being four times stronger than one or both of
the other targets, as well as the reverse, e.g. a disposition to interest rate
smoothing being up to twice as high as either inflation or unemployment sta-
bilization. Of course, since the parameters are jointly drawn from uniform
distributions over the relevant range, we allow for all intermediate combina-
tions as well, thus covering a broad range of relevant policy preferences.
1.5. Simulating Optimal Policy
1.5.1. Optimal reaction coefficients under adaptive learning. To
simulate optimal policy decisions under learning we infer the successive esti-
mates of the model as described in the section on adaptive learning, for each
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draw of the policy preference vector we compute the optimal feedback rule for
each time t given the prevailing estimates as of that date, and evaluate the
implied date t optimal interest rate using the latest estimate of the Nairu along
with the observations of inflation and unemployment.
The optimal policy is a feedback rule linear in the 10–dimensional state
vector, which as is clear from the above is time dependent. As an example,
the rule for the benchmark US central banker in 1965 is given by
(1.18)
it = 0.3 + 0.1pit−1 + 0.08pit−2 + 0.03pit−3 + 0.01pit−4 − 0.6xt + 0.8xt−1 + 0.7it−1
while the rule in 1990 is given by
(1.19)
it = 2.1 + 0.3pit−1 + 0.15pit−2 + 0.04pit−3 + 0.02pit−4 − 1.7xt + 1.3xt−1 + 0.6it−1
Instead of reporting all ten coefficients and their evolution over time, we focus
on useful summary statistics, the sum of the feedback coefficients on the lags
of inflation, Gpi = Fpi1 + . . .+ Fpi4 , the analogous sum corresponding to unem-
ployment, Gx = Fu1 + Fu2 , and the inertial parameter, the coefficient on the
lagged nominal interest rate, Gv.
Noting that the coefficients on ut and u
∗
t as well as those on their lags sum
to zero2, which means that although the response to the state vector allows for
unrestricted responses to each unemployment and the Nairu, it in fact implies
a feedback to the unemployment gap instead of its two components. We can
compare the optimal policy rule with a Taylor rule by observing that a simple
rule that approximates our optimal feedback rule is given by
(1.20) it = Gc +Gpipit +Gxxt +Gvit−1
and recalling that the traditional Taylor rule for the target interest rate
(1.21) i∗t = r¯ + pi
∗ + gpi(pit − pi∗) + gxxt
relates to the actual interest rate which also incorporates a smoothing objective
via
(1.22) it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)i∗t
2In the case κ = 1; otherwise the inflationary bias yields an extra term in unemployment,
which we will ignore for this discussion.
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we can map our more complex dynamically optimal rule on a Taylor type rule
to obtain
gpi = Gpi/(1−Gv)(1.23)
gx = Gx/(1−Gv)(1.24)
r¯ = [Gc − (1−Gv −Gpi)pi∗]/(1−Gv)(1.25)
This reduction to a simple rule facilitates its comparison to other studies, in
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Figure 1.5: Approximate interest rate response to inflation. The shaded area
represents the response coefficient for all preferences under consideration.
that our summary measures from the optimal feedback rules can be contrasted
to standard Taylor rule coefficients. The evolution of the optimal feedback to
inflation is plotted in figure 1.5, which offers shaded areas containing the opti-
mal feedback coefficients for all parameterizations of policy preferences under
consideration. A striking feature is that the optimal response to inflation
endogenously starts rising from values below one in the early seventies and
reaches its maximum just before the disinflation period begins, the time that
is usually considered to mark the switch from bad policy to sound policy mak-
ing that eventually ended the GI. This finding sheds new light on this debate,
as it shows that a particular type of optimizing policymaker would have acted
in the same way as is typically attributed to Fed chairmen before and after
Paul Volcker. In our model the policymaker’s preferences are fixed over the
whole sample under consideration, in particular, he faces the same objective
function before and after 1980, yet the stance against inflation substantially
changes. In our model this is entirely due to the learning dynamics. The policy
that is repeatedly identified as inappropriate in other studies (e.g. Clarida et
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al.) differs from the policy in the latter years only in the degree of imperfect
information that the policymakers were facing when making decisions. Fur-
thermore, US and UK policies converge to a similar behavior against inflation
as in the latter part of the sample the feedback coefficients are almost identi-
cal. The feedback coefficients on the unemployment gap are plotted in figure
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Figure 1.6: Approximate interest rate response to the unemployment gap.
The shaded area represents the response coefficient for all preferences under
consideration.
1.6. Apart from the large swings in the UK model which are due to the strong
fluctuations in the perceived Phillips curve slope (cf. section 1.3), both models
eventually approach a common value between −1 and −2, depending on the
exact specification of preferences. Optimal interest rate inertia as depicted in
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Figure 1.7: Interest rate smoothing for all preferences under consideration,
summarized by the shaded area.
figure 1.7 has been quite stable in the US, falling slightly from initial values
around 0.8 to somewhat lower levels around 0.6. In the UK model it had an
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upward tendency in the first quarters reaching a level of 0.9 in 1970 and after
a subsequent drop to 0.3 in the first part of the seventies it slightly adjusted
to values around 0.5 for the last 10 years of the sample. It should be noted
that the smoothing component will be lower in the complex dynamic rule due
to the additional channel from the lagged terms.
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Figure 1.8: Simulated optimal interest rates for our benchmark calibration
(line in the shaded region), for different preference parameters (shaded region)
and historical interest rates (thick line).
1.5.2. Optimal policy paths under adaptive learning. Figure 1.8
summarizes our main results. It contains a range of optimal interest rate
paths a learning policy maker would have set given his preferences can be
expressed as a quadratic loss with parameters from the distributions discussed
in the previous section. The figure also depicts actual interest rates as set by
the Fed (thick line in the left panel), and the Bank of England (thick line in
the right panel). The dashed line is the result of our benchmark calibration.
There are several interesting observations to be made.
First, although we allow for a wide range of preferences, the resulting poli-
cies are qualitatively similar and highly correlated, thus policymakers with
quite different preferences would have behaved rather similar in terms of char-
acteristics such as maximum and minimum rates and turning points in the
setting of interest rates.
Second, while historical interest rates and optimal ones were very close
to each other–and almost coincide for the post–1980 subsample, they display
substantial differences in the early part of the sample. This is true for the
US case but in particular for the UK economy where both the deviations from
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US model UK model
Correlation Ratio Correlation Ratio
GI episode 0.73 0.77 0.50 0.59
Post GI episode 0.98 1.01 0.75 1.13
Full sample 0.86 0.94 0.58 0.98
Table 1.1: Correlation of optimal interest rate paths with historical rates and
the ratio of both series.
optimality and eventually also the extend of the GI were more pronounced. We
therefore conclude that historical monetary policy was not entirely consistent
with optimal behavior during the Great Inflation period.
However, our third observation is the strong comovement of historical rates
with interest rates set by an optimizing but learning central banker. Indeed,
even during the Great Inflation period the corresponding correlations are very
high, as is documented by table 1.1, although historical interest rates were
persistently lower, with the ratio being 0.8 in the US model and 0.6 in the UK
model. Chapter 2 will investigate this finding in more detail. The post–1980
period is characterized by optimal rates coinciding with historical ones, the
ratio being approximately unity.
Finally, we note that qualitatively the results for the US economy are iden-
tical to those of the UK economy. In both the US and the UK case we find
that the discrepancy between actual and optimal rates widens in the advent
of the high inflation episode where an optimal regulator would recommend
very aggressive interest rates to counter the rise in inflation, and observe this
gap to close as strong interest rate movements–consistent with optimal policy
rates–in both countries finally bring inflation back to moderate levels, where it
is maintained until today with interest rate decisions being perfectly consistent
with optimal behavior of a learning policy maker for the remaining 25 years
of the sample.
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1.6. Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous section we found that neither US nor UK interest rates
were consistent with recommendations of a learning optimal regulator. How-
ever, one might argue that while we already considered a broad range of policy
preferences, there might be specifications which are better capable of repro-
ducing historical rates. Thus in this section we shall review optimal policy
paths but reassess the effect of all relevant parameters. In each step we will fix
all parameters but one on their benchmark values, enlarge the intervals of this
free parameter to cover a sufficiently broad range, and investigate the effect of
varying this parameter. Among them we will consider the HP filter smooth-
ing parameter µ and the gain value γ of the adaptive learning algorithm, so
we cover all relevant specifications of learning. Additionally, we will investi-
gate the sensitivity of our results towards different values of the policy impact
coefficient λ and we will investigate the contribution of varying single policy
preference parameters. This will allow us to explore whether our main finding
of non–optimality was an artifact of a too narrow specification or whether it
holds more generally.
Optimal US interest rates Optimal UK interest rates
1960 1970 1980 1990 20001960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
Figure 1.9: Optimal interest rates for varying weight on unemployment stabi-
lization, 0.25 ≤ ωx ≤ 4.
Policymakers with different weights on unemployment stabiliza-
tion. At first, we shall be interested in varying the importance the policy-
maker attaches to unemployment stabilization, as expressed by the relative
weight in the policy function, ωu. We consider values that make the concern
about inflation four times as large as that about unemployment stabilization,
i.e. ωu = 1/4 and vice versa, as well as all intermediate values.
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As is clear from figure 1.9, our main result still holds under all possible
weight parameters. While changing the focus on unemployment yields paths
for the US rate that differ in particular during the GI episode, all recommended
rates remain substantially higher then historical rates. Again, preceding and
following the GI historical rates are within the range of interest rates set by
an optimizing learner, except for the period around 1990 where inflation rates
reached the highest post–GI levels in our sample and where historical rates
appear too conservative, again. In the UK case the changes in the relative
weight on the unemployment gap has little impact on the resulting optimal
interest rates. In particular in periods with extremely high inflation rates the
unemployment objective appears to be subordinate, so that changing its weight
has little effect.
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Figure 1.10: Optimal interest rates for varying weight on the interest rate
smoothing component, 0.25 ≤ ων ≤ 4.
Policymakers with different weights on interest rate smoothing.
For the second relative weight in the loss function we choose the same range,
ων ∈ [1/4, 4]. As in the previous exercise, the change in the relative weight on
interest rate smoothing has a small effect on optimal rates, cf. figure 1.10. Pol-
icymakers judging variation in the interest rate very differently will nonetheless
qualitatively agree on optimal rates, although of course policymakers with a
low smoothing objective will allow for higher interest rates in the wake of the
GI, in particular in the UK model where recommended rates reach very high
levels in the mid–seventies consistent with the very high levels of inflation,
while even a high smoothing objective has little effect on optimal rates given
the high inflation rates.
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Results for various degrees of inflationary bias. Figure 1.11 plots
optimal policy decisions from policymakers that differ only in their tendency
to allow for an inflation bias, that is in the choice of their preference parameter
κ. We allow this parameter to vary over the whole admissible range from
zero to one. The range of optimal interest rates widens substantially as we
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Figure 1.11: Optimal interest rates for different degrees of inflationary bias,
0 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
include the paths pursued by fictitious central bankers with a strong tendency
to reach unnaturally low unemployment rates at the cost of higher inflation.
Interestingly, the period which is interesting for our question changes little:
as inflation continues to rise, recommended rates approximately coincide with
those from our benchmark simulation. Surprisingly, the inflation bias has little
impact on optimal UK rates, as shown by the tight band of optimal interest
rate paths.
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Figure 1.12: Optimal interest rates for different learning algorithms as specified
by the gain parameter, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.06.
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Sensitivity towards the learning gain parameter. The gain value
reflects two opposing forces: one is the desire to put higher weights on more
recent observations to improve estimates in presence of structural breaks; in
this regard higher gain values perform better, given that the learning dynamics
are substantial as discussed earlier; the other is the desire to use sufficient
sample information; if the gain value is too high there are effectively too few
observations included in the estimates. The accord in the learning literature is
on a gain value of γ = 0.03, but values around this particular value are equally
reasonable. Specifically, we allow for gain values in the range [0, 0.06]. It should
be noted, that with our non–recursive, discounted least squares formulation,
a zero gain coincides with ordinary least squares, cf. appendix A.1, so our
analysis nests all relevant learning specifications.
One might suspect that results are largely driven by the way learning is
modelled, but as figure 1.12 confirms, quantitative differences in the estimates
resulting from different gain parameters have little effect on optimal interest
rate paths. This is an interesting observations since it documents that the
assumption of adaptive learning per se has an important impact on our view
of historical events, regardless of the particular specification of the learning
algorithm.
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Figure 1.13: Optimal interest rates for different assumptions on the HP
smoothing parameter used to extract the Nairu; among the values under con-
sideration is the standard value 1600 but also the values that yield smooth
Nairu paths as discussed in section 1.3.
Changing the perceived smoothness of the Nairu. We used a HP
smoothing parameter that reproduced the time variation in the Nairu that is
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documented in the empirical literature, in particular Gordon (1997) for US
data and Batini and Greenslade (2006) for UK data. However, we might
also choose the more prominent value of 1600 for quarterly data or other
lower as well as higher values than in our basic calibration. Specifically, we
consider values 10c with c ∈ [3.2, 6.7]. This exponential formulation allows us
to put more weight on values that yield smooth series which we consider more
plausible, as discussed in section 1.3, with the first entry giving the standard
value.
Figure 1.13 plots the policy paths resulting from this exercise. As for the
other parameters the HP smoothing value has little effect on optimal rates,
the most notable differences appearing around the turning points of the Nairu,
where differences in the smoothing parameter temporarily affects the perceived
unemployment gap in different ways.
Apart from these few dates, the effect of decreasing µ is a more volatile
perceived Nairu path in the first place. With this variable tracking the unem-
ployment rate more closely, the resulting unemployment gap estimates become
smaller in magnitude, but they remain qualitatively comparable to gap esti-
mates resulting from lower values of µ. That is, all perceived paths of the
unemployment paths obtained for different smoothing parameters are highly
correlated and differ mainly in their amplitude. On the other hand, with the
amplitude being low, the estimates of the Phillips curve slope will be high so
that the product of both will be qualitatively the same across various smooth-
ing parameters.
It should be noted, however, that a very volatile Nairu path obtained e.g.
for the commonly used smoothing parameter µ = 1, 600 implies that the pol-
icymaker cannot avoid most of the variation in the unemployment rate, only
the residuary and small deviations from it, and that even those departures of
unemployment from the Nairu, misleadingly perceived as small, are thought
to be highly effective. Thus, policymakers will recognize themselves being able
to stabilize inflation with very little costs in real activity. This conjecture shall
be analyzed in our companion paper where we verify these considerations.
Results under different assumptions on the policy impact coeffi-
cient. As argued in section 1.3, it is helpful for the analysis under adaptive
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learning to fix at least one of the parameters, the impact of the policy instru-
ment on real activity, λ. However, this section is intended to demonstrate that
this restriction does not significantly influence our findings. As argued above,
some researchers use low values for this parameter, e.g. λ = 0.024 in Primiceri
(2006), while other estimates indicate values of −0.035 (cf. Smets (2002)),
and standard calibrations (Orphanides (2002)) suggest higher values around
λ = 0.08. We will thus consider the whole range implied by these different
values. Figure 1.14 plots the policy paths resulting from this exercise. As is
obvious from this figure, our conclusions hold regardless of the specific value,
though very low impact coefficients tend to invoke more aggressive policy de-
cisions as their effect is limited by the low coefficient. The quantitative impact
of changes in these parameters appears limited and optimal interest rate paths
change little except for slightly higher rates at the peak dates.
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Figure 1.14: Optimal interest rates under different assumptions on the policy
impact coefficient, 0.024 ≤ λ ≤ 0.08.
Summary of the results. While the interest rate paths naturally differ
for variations in the underlying key parameters, the finding that optimal rates
exceed those historically observed holds for all specifications. Our robustness
analysis demonstrates that it is the assumption of imperfect knowledge over-
come by continuous data observation that yields our results, not any particular
set of preference parameters or the specifics of the learning algorithms.
1.7. Conclusions
Our research question was to assess whether historical interest rates in the
US and the UK are consistent with an optimizing but learning policymaker.
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We found that there are no policy preferences that are entirely in line with
those rates. In particular during the Great Inflation episode optimally recom-
mended rates were substantially higher than those observed in the data, while
in subsequent periods the interest rates set by the Fed and the Bank of Eng-
land coincide with those of an optimizing learner. Nevertheless, for the whole
sample we found a high positive correlation of US and UK interest rates with
optimal rates. This high correlation is also present during the Great Inflation
episode where actual rates comoved with optimally prescribed rates but were
more conservative, while at the same time the standard deviation of the rel-
evant estimates was substantially higher than in the following period. This
suggests a connection with Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle that calls
for such attenuate action in such a framework. Our results thus hint at the
importance of integrating choice under uncertainty into the adaptive learning
methodology.
Our robustness analysis demonstrated that the specification matters little
for our results. Not only are the qualitative insights unchanged but even
the quantitative impact of substantial changes in preferences and other key
parameters such as the learning speed do not exert a substantial influence on
our findings.
Our second result concerns the common view that policy considerably
changed when Paul Volcker became chairman of the Fed. While we consider
the same policymaker being in place for the whole period under consideration,
his beliefs of key parameters and hence the response to target variables changes
endogenously. This sheds new light onto the debate on whether the disinflation
can be attributed to a change in the Fed’s chairmanship, an argument that is
for example advanced by Clarida et al. (2000). In our model every optimizing
policymaker would have revised his stance on inflation and unemployment sta-
bilization at around the time when Paul Volcker became chairman of the Fed,
while conversely in the seventies any policymaker would have conducted pol-
icy in a way that would nowadays be criticized for having been non–optimal.
This is an interesting result because it attributes the improvement in policy to
endogenous forces rather then an exogenous change and thus applies equally
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well for different countries such as the UK which–as documented in the sec-
tion presenting the learning results–faced qualitatively the same evolution of
beliefs.
The fundamental question that still remains is whether the GI could have
been avoided if the policymaker had acted more in line with optimally pre-
scribed rates. This research question is taken up in the second chapter of this
thesis, along with an investigation of the role Brainard–type uncertainty plays
in our framework.
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CHAPTER 2
Did the Great Inflation occur despite optimal policy?
2.1. Introduction
The term Great Inflation (GI) refers to the prolonged high inflation pe-
riod experienced in the United States, and similarly in other industrialized
countries, for almost twenty years. Beginning in the mid–sixties, US inflation
gradually increased, peaking at double digit levels in the mid–seventies and re-
mained high for a sustained period, until it finally returned to low levels under
Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker. This rapid decline in the early eighties
is now referred to as Volcker Disinflation. A large amount of research has been
conducted to explain this episode, but until now it seems difficult to explain
all relevant empirical facts consistently in a model. This introduction gives a
brief description of these facts and reviews some representative explanations
that have been advanced in the literature.
Beginning in the 1960s, US inflation gradually increased, reaching a max-
imum of 12 percent in 1974. Although it decreased for a while, it remained
high on average and peaked again above 10 percent by the end of 1980. This
second peak was followed by a sharp disinflation, which quickly brought the
inflation rate below 4 percent within two years and to an average level of 2.5
percent thereafter. Unemployment lagged inflation, peaking one year and two
years, respectively, after inflation.
One prominent view expresses doubt on whether policy was conducted
properly at the time. Clarida et al. (2000) argue in a New Keynesian model
that monetary policy during that episode can be described as following a Taylor
rule of the form
(2.1) it = i
∗ + gpi(Etpit+1 − pi∗) + gxxt,
It is well known in the literature, that rules of this type imply an indeterminate
system for a large set of parameter constellations (gpi, gx) in these models. By
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using wrong Taylor rule parameters and thus admitting self–fulfilling expecta-
tions, an inappropriate policy contributed to the Great Inflation.
Christiano and Gust (1999) express doubt on whether the stagflationary
episode with jointly high inflation and unemployment can be explained in a
New Keynesian model, as indeterminacy is associated with weak responsive-
ness to expected inflation, 0 < gpi < 1. If expectations rise for some reason, the
real interest rate falls, since the nominal rate rises by less than the increase in
expectations. This lower real rate stimulates aggregate demand and, via the
Calvo (1983) pricing assumption, produces upward pressure on prices, accom-
modating the initial increase in expected inflation and thus establishing them
as self–fulfilling. Hence high inflation occurs in the New Keynesian Model si-
multaneously with low unemployment. The authors show, how in the Limited
Participation model developed by Christiano et al. (1997), the self–fulfilling
prophecy hypothesis can contribute to the debate. In this model, an initial
rise in expectations and the associated fall in the real rate lead to reduced
savings of the private sector. As a consequence less money is deposited in
the financial market, in which firms have an unchanged demand for liquidity,
which they need to finance their expenditures. This creates upward pressure
on the nominal rate, which must be accommodated by the central bank by a
monetary injection. In this model the rising nominal interest rate depresses
investment expenditure and thus real activity, while the monetary expansion
fuels inflation. This setup thus predicts the stagflation that is present in the
data.
Orphanides and van Norden (2002) add an important observation to the
discussion. He points out that policy makers base their decisions on real time
data, while most of the literature, e.g. Clarida et al. (2000), uses revised
data that became available several years after policy decisions were taken.1
In this regard, one has to use real time data if one’s goal is to analyze the
appropriateness of policy decisions. Orphanides and van Norden suggest an
intermediate concept, referred to as “quasi–real time data” that makes use
1The distinction between real time and quasi–real time data is important. Both concepts
make use of samples that were available in the period in question, but while real time data
also uses vintage time series, quasi–real time data considers segments of revised data series,
as we do in this work since the latter are easily available while the former are usually not.
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of revised data series but allows inference only from subsamples ending in
the periods in which the corresponding decisions are made. In this spirit
their analysis reveals that a determinate Taylor rule was in place, given the
quasi–real time data, but that measurement problems, in particular related
to the output gap, contributed to wrong policy decisions, and an a posteriori
indeterminate system.
Goodfriend (1993) emphasizes credibility issues. A lack of commitment on
part of the central bank led inflation expectations to become uncoupled from
the underlying system, a phenomenon he refers to as inflation scares.
A common feature of the above interpretations is the central role of ex-
pectations, in particular those of inflation. Another common feature, however,
is the impact of exogenous factors. Either the policymakers’ preferences shift
exogenously in advance of the Volcker Disinflation, as in Clarida et al. (2000)
or expectations fluctuate exogenously, as in the explanation of Goodfriend
(1993). Although it seems clear that expectations crucially depend on the
economic environment and in particular on monetary policy, the above models
are not capable of explaining why expectations did not stay well anchored.
More recent research endogenizes the formation of expectations and is able to
explain the evolution of beliefs, similar to the inflation scares as depicted by
Goodfriend.
Orphanides and Williams (2005) present a model with private agents, who
continuously update their beliefs concerning unknown parameters of the model
and the unobservable Nairu, which is the rate of unemployment that induces no
movement of inflation, frequently referred to as the non–accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment, a term which led to the acronym Nairu. A key element
in their analysis is the use of real time data. As the policy makers face measure-
ment problems, misperceptions appear unavoidable. Expectation formation is
assumed to be rational, apart from the need to make inference on unknown
parameters. The learning mechanism, however, provides an additional prop-
agation mechanism that causes parameter beliefs and hence expectations to
fluctuate, thus endogenizing Goodfriend’s inflation scares. They simulate in-
flation and unemployment paths under the hypothesis that either the Nairu
was known or that the expectation formation mechanism remains fixed. As a
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result they find that absent either Nairu misperceptions or learning elements,
the high and prolonged inflation would not have occurred.
In a recent paper Primiceri (2006) offers a coherent explanation of the Great
Inflation in a New Keynesian model with an optimizing but learning policy
maker. His model explains all empirical features, including the gradual initial
rise in inflation, the sudden Volcker disinflation and the fact that inflation
leads unemployment. A detailed description of Primiceri’s model is offered in
the next section. It is complementary to the work of Orphanides and Williams
(2005, 2007) in that these authors demonstrate that the Great Inflation would
not have occurred under perfect information, whereas Primiceri shows that it
is the most likely consequence of imperfect knowledge.
2.2. Explaining the Great Inflation
Primiceri’s model offers an economically plausible explanation for the Great
Inflation. Starting point is the observation that in the 1960s the estimates of
the Nairu were too low. Consequently, unemployment was mistakenly per-
ceived to be significantly above satisfactory levels, prompting for stimulative
monetary policy to promote economic recovery. At the same time, the inflation
process was perceived as strongly mean–reverting, with a low degree of per-
sistence. The rise in inflation was thus initially believed to be transitory and
hence acceptable. The true inflation process, being highly persistent, caused
an overly stimulative policy to push inflation further upward. Inflation peaked
at a level of 12 percent in 1974:4 and remained high for a sustained period.
Slowly, policy makers began to realize the persistent nature of inflation.
At this point estimates of the Nairu were still relatively low, so any at-
tempt to control inflation via a positive unemployment gap appeared to fail:
while the true gap was small and so was the implied reaction of inflation, the
perceived gap was large, so the moderate reaction of inflation was attributed
to a low impact coefficient. With an estimated Phillips curve slope near zero,
it seemed virtually impossible (or unacceptable) to reduce inflation by admit-
ting the required higher unemployment. Thus policy, assessing its situation as
incapable of curing the economy, remained inactive.
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On the other hand, with the high degree of persistence detected by now in
the inflation process, even small changes in the perceived trade–off would en-
force strong actions. This is what Primiceri suggests happened during the
tenure of Paul Volcker. A sequence of favorable shocks revealed that the
inflation–unemployment tradeoff was slightly higher than previously antici-
pated, inducing quickly rising interest rates. Hence, unemployment was pushed
sufficiently above the true Nairu, causing the true Phillips curve mechanism
to settle down inflation. As soon as this had been accomplished, the monetary
authority allowed unemployment to return quickly to the neutral level given
by the Nairu.
This interpretation can explain the slow and persistent rise in inflation (it
was perceived transitory and thus not worth sacrificing unemployment, which
was perceived to be high anyway), the prolonged period in which inflation was
not brought back to lower levels (the policy maker felt incapable of reduc-
ing it at acceptable costs), and the fact that inflation leaded unemployment
(unemployment was held high until inflation was sufficiently low).
2.3. Model, Estimation, and Learning
This section discusses our dynamic model of inflation and unemployment,
and estimates variants of it after a brief digression on variable transformations
used in the empirical analysis. Finally, we investigate the learning algorithm
used by the policymaker.
2.3.1. The Model. We set up a reduced form of the New Keynesian
model as discussed by Woodford (2003) where we identify real activity as the
deviation of unemployment from the Nairu, xt ≡ ut−u∗t , as in Primiceri (2006)
and the previous chapter, where expectations have been replaced by backward
looking terms,
pit = cpi + α(L)pit−1 + θ(L)xt−1 + εpit(2.2a)
xt = ρ(L)xt−1 + λ(rt−1 − r¯) + εxt(2.2b)
While the theoretical model is specified with a lag length of one, empirical
studies usually use longer lags structures in the pricing and demand equations,
cf. e.g. Gordon (1997) for US data and Greenslade et al. (2003) as well as
Batini and Greenslade (2006) for UK data, so we follow Primiceri in choosing
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an order of two for the lag polynomials, balancing both theoretical scarcity
and empirical needs. Such a model is standard in the empirical literature and
in the adaptive learning literature in particular, cf. Orphanides and Williams
(2005) among others.
2.3.2. Estimation and Demeaning. Theoretical models of this sort are
defined in terms of deviations of inflation and the policy instrument from their
steady state values. As is also recognized by Primiceri (2006), the two con-
stants and the level of the Nairu are not jointly identified. Empirical analy-
sis usually resolves this issue by identifying equilibrium values by the sample
means, referring to this as demeaning prior to estimation. Since we are con-
sidering a relatively long sample that covers the unusually high rates from the
GI episodes, the sample means appear inappropriate as approximations for the
equilibrium values. For a comparable sample, Smets (2002) uses an arbitrary
linear detrending method for inflation while Primiceri treats the Nairu as sta-
tionary and fixes its equilibrium value at the sample mean of unemployment.
The standard demeaning procedure would implicitly subtract the sample
means from inflation, which are given by 3.5 percent for US data and 6.4 per-
cent for UK data. At least in a stationary environment this would imply that
without policy interference inflation would stabilize around these high values
eventually. Any attempt to attain a lower equilibrium rate would necessitate
to permanently hold unemployment above the Nairu to assure a balance be-
tween his inflation and unemployment goals. It appears more reasonable to
assume that the equilibrium inflation rate is consistent with the policymaker’s
target rate, hence we impose these values instead of relying on sample means.
The same applies for the real rate. Therefore, we calibrate the equilibrium
value of the real rate of interest at r¯ = 3 percent and identify the equilibrium
inflation level with the policymaker’s target value for inflation, pi∗ = 2 percent,
which appears consistent with other empirical studies, cf. e.g. Orphanides and
Williams (2005) and Gerlach and Svensson (2003), and actual central bank be-
havior. This expresses the presumption that the goal set by the policymaker
can be achieved in a dynamically consistent way.
2.3.3. Estimation Results. Before we can simulate paths for inflation
and unemployment, we need to estimate the model which we will use as the
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true data generating process. We will do so by estimating an appropriate state
space form of our basic equations, depending on the specification we wish to
use. We shall use two different scenarios, one being the unrestricted model
and the other featuring a unit root in inflation.
To jointly estimate the path of the Nairu and the parameters of the model,
we need to set up an appropriate state space form.
Collecting the observable variables in the measurement vectormt = (pit, ut)
′,
and the unobservable variables in the state vector st = (u
∗
t , u
∗
t−1, u
∗
t−2, α1,t, α2,t)
′,
we can estimate our benchmark model by maximizing the likelihood of the state
space model
mt =
(
0 −θ1 −θ2 pit−1 pit−2
1 −ρ1 −ρ2 0 0
)
st +
(
θ1 θ2 0
ρ1 ρ2 λ
)
xt +
(
εpit
εxt
)
(2.3)
st =

1 0 0
03×21 0 0
0 1 0
02×3 I2
 st−1 +

ε∗t
0
0
0
(2.4)
with the exogenous vector xt = (ut−1, ut−2, rt−1)′ and rt ≡ it − p¯it where p¯i is a
four–quarter moving average of current and past inflation as in Rudebusch and
Svensson (1998). The unit root version incorporates the restriction α1+α2 = 1,
cf. Hamilton (1994) for a discussion, so we estimate the modified state space
model, now in the state vector st = (u
∗
t , u
∗
t−1, u
∗
t−2, α1,t)
′
mt =
(
0 −θ1 −θ2 ∆pit−1
1 −ρ1 −ρ2 0
)
st +
(
θ1 θ2 0 1
ρ1 ρ2 λ 0
)
xt +
(
εpit
εxt
)
(2.5)
st =

1 0 0
03×11 0 0
0 1 0
01×3 1
 st−1 +

ε∗t
0
0
0
(2.6)
with the exogenous vector xt = (ut−1, ut−2, rt−1, pit−2)′.
Table 2.1 supplies the estimation results for the two versions for US and
UK data, and figure 2.1 plots the corresponding estimates of the Nairu paths.
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US model UK model
unrestricted unit root unrestricted unit root
α1 0.646 [ 8.52] 0.672 [ 9.00] 1.384 [ 22.29] 1.414 [ 22.54]
α2 0.298 [ 3.94] 0.328 [ ] -0.427 [ -6.88] -0.414 [ ]
θ1 -0.935 [ -2.65] -1.081 [ -3.04] -1.060 [ -3.12] -1.353 [ -3.88]
θ2 0.811 [ 2.29] 0.983 [ 2.76] 0.950 [ 2.69] 1.318 [ 3.66]
ρ1 1.667 [ 25.08] 1.670 [ 25.17] 1.939 [ 26.09] 1.940 [ 25.72]
ρ2 -0.711 [-10.78] -0.715 [-10.89] -0.999 [-13.59] -0.999 [-13.38]
σ2pi 1.379 [ 8.65] 1.394 [ 8.55] 1.150 [ 9.01] 1.168 [ 8.80]
σ2x 0.045 [ 6.02] 0.045 [ 6.02] 0.050 [ 5.54] 0.051 [ 5.42]
L -270.26 -271.56 -325.84 -328.47
Table 2.1: Estimation results for US and UK data for the unrestricted and
unit root versions. T–statistics in brackets.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated Nairu paths in the unrestricted model (solid lines) and
the unit root model (dashed lines).
2.3.4. Learning. This section intends to give a brief review of the mech-
anism of learning. For a more detailed exposition, the reader is referred to
the corresponding section of chapter 1. As discussed there, the policymaker is
assumed to revise his perceived law of motion,
pit = cˆpi + αˆ1pit−1 + αˆ2pit−2 + θˆ1xt|t−1 + θˆ2xt|t−2 + εpit(2.7a)
xt = cˆx + ρˆ1xt|t−1 + ρˆ2xt|t−2 + λ(it−1 − p¯it−1) + εxt ,(2.7b)
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Figure 2.2: Perceptions of inflation persistence as measured by the largest
eigenvalue (solid lines) and the sum of AR(2) coefficients (dashed lines).
in each period. Firstly, he extracts the Nairu with the HP Filter. After com-
puting the unemployment gap as difference between unemployment and the
Nairu, he may choose to discount all regressors and endogenous variables with
a geometrically declining scaling factor, or leave them in their original form.
Depending on this choice he computes the least squares estimates in either
the transformed or the original model, the former method being referred to as
discounted least squares, cf. Harvey (1993). The choice of a discount factor δ
which is used to scale an observation s periods in the past by δs, corresponds
to a method frequently applied in the adaptive learning literature to reflect
agents’ concern about structural changes. The related learning algorithms are
referred to as constant gain algorithms, and they are recursive formulations of
discounted least squares. Chapter 1 and appendix A.1 provide a more detailed
account of this topic.
Over time, the central banker accumulates knowledge on the Nairu and
the model’s parameters. As his information set grows, his perceptions about
economic relations evolve over time, and in each period imply an updated
transition law of the economy that he uses to set interest rates optimally.
Before proceeding to a brief description of his decision problem, we examine a
few summary statistics regarding his beliefs.
Of particular interest is the change in policymakers’ perceptions regarding
inflation persistence and the path of the Nairu over time. Figure 2.2 depicts the
estimates of the sum of autoregressive coefficients in the Phillips curve, α1+α2
(dashed line). This sum is a standard reference value to assess persistence
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Figure 2.3: Upper panels depict the true (thick line) and perceived unemploy-
ment gaps, the bottom panels illustrate the Nairu misperceptions.
in the inflation rate. As can be seen, inflation was seen as a strongly mean–
reverting process until the mid–seventies while thereafter agents became aware
of its highly persistent nature, although it is viewed as stationary in most
subsamples. It can be argued that a more appropriate measure of persistence
is the dominant eigenvalue of the Phillips curve. Figure 2.2 also contains the
evolution of this measure (thick line). Apparently, both measures give a very
similar idea of inflation persistence.
The Nairu estimates change substantially over time, as is equally docu-
mented by Orphanides and van Norden (2002) and our previous analysis in
chapter 1. Early quarters in our sample are characterized by a large and per-
sistent underestimation of the Nairu, which for the prevailing unemployment
rates pushes real activity more in the focus than it should have in retrospect.
For a graphical illustration, see figure 2.3. This figure plots the US and UK
unemployment gaps as perceived in real time (dashed) and based on the like-
lihood estimates of the Nairu, which we refer to as true Nairu.
Interestingly, the Nairu misperceptions in the US and the UK model share
strong qualitative similarities, strongly comoving and being of the same sign
that they switch at around the same dates, though of course their amplitude
differs owing to the different smoothness assumptions imposed on the Nairu
path.
Orphanides and Williams (2005) construct an analogous series of US Nairu
misperceptions based on narrative evidence, and despite the use of a different
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methodology present remarkably similar results. They also report initial neg-
ative misperceptions, which imply an overly optimistic view about low levels
of the Nairu, which were falsified in retrospect. They support our finding that
the level of the Nairu was persistently underestimated until the early eighties.
The policymaker sets nominal interest rates to minimize a standard infinite
sequence of quadratic period losses,
(2.8)
∑
s≥t
βs−t[(pis − pi∗)2 + ωu(us − kuˆ∗t|s)2 + ων(vs − vs−1)2]
which punish deviations of inflation from the target value pi∗, changes in the
interest rate, and deviations of unemployment from a target level that equals
a fraction κ of the Nairu. The case in which this fraction is one corresponds
to the standard case, while all other parameter choices for κ imply the desire
to push unemployment below the Nairu, as in the Barro and Gordon (1983)
model, where surprise inflation is used to attain higher than normal levels of
real activity. This parameter gives us the flexibility to account for subopti-
mal policy behavior associated with the inflation bias associated in Barro and
Gordon’s model.
Given that the central bank’s model of the economy changes each period,
it will have to recompute the optimal feedback to the state of the economy
in each period. For fixed policy preferences and data series that we sequen-
tially generate with the model equations and the estimates from table 2.1, as
described in more detail below.
2.4. Simulation Results
This section presents our simulation results of an adaptively learning but
optimizing policymaker. We precede the main part which presents the sim-
ulation in detail by a discussion on the benchmark without learning. The
following section will then conduct robustness checks on our basic learning
exercise and a final part considers the effect of incorporating findings from
chapter 1 into the analysis and find that a combination of adaptive learning
and policy conservatism replicates the prolonged and very high inflationary
episodes in the United States and the United Kingdom.
2.4.1. Benchmark scenario without learning. To contrast our adap-
tive learning results with the no learning case we consider the case of perfect
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information, where the policymaker has knowledge of all relevant variables and
parameter values. The true data generating process can be parameterized by a
vector ξ∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2, θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2, ρ
∗
1, ρ
∗
2)
′ containing the unrestricted estimates of the
models from table 2.1. We consider the case of no inflationary bias, i.e. κ = 1,
since this yields a stationary model, with optimal policy feedback parameters
on the unemployment and Nairu terms summing to zero, so that we can refor-
mulate the dynamics under optimal policy of a perfectly informed policymaker
in form of a stationary autoregressive process as2
(2.9) y˜t = c+My˜t−1 + ε˜t
in the stationary variables y˜t = (pit, pit−1, pit−1, pit−1, ut − u∗t , ut−1 − u∗t−1, vt)
and deduce mean and variance of inflation from the vector of unconditional
expectations E(y˜) = (I −M)−1c and the unconditional covariance matrix Σ˜
which is implicitly defined by the Lyapunov equation Σ˜ = MΣ˜M ′ + cov(ε˜).
Even under perfect information inflation can reach arbitrarily high values
although higher values become less likely. Accordingly, we shall refer to a
path of inflation exhibiting a Great Inflation only in case it peaks at unusually
high levels, in the sense of exceeding the critical value, picrit, that would be
surpassed only with a small probability, say five percent, in our perfect knowl-
edge benchmark. Formally, this value is defined as Prob(pi > picrit) = 0.05 with
the probability measure being defined by the law of motion (2.9). Table 2.2
summarizes the relevant values for the US and UK benchmark models. Inter-
estingly, historical inflation reached substantially higher values than would be
expected in a no–learning environment.
2.4.2. Simulation of Optimal Dynamics under Adaptive Learning.
We use the the first five years as training samples to determine initial beliefs,
that is 1954:3–1959:4 for the US model and 1960:2–1965:3 for the UK model.
For any subsequent date t the policymakers reestimate their perceived law
of motion (2.7) for the given subsample and set up an optimal path for the
2In the case allowing for an inflationary bias, k < 1, the optimal policy feedback would
also include a reaction to the level of unemployment and hence would inherit the non–
stationarity of the Nairu. Primiceri offers evidence that the inflation bias term is not very
important.
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Model Mean Variance Critical Value Inflation peak
US model 2% 3.1% 7.0% 11.7%
UK model 2% 4.6% 9.5% 21.6%
Table 2.2: Unconditional mean, variance and a critical value of inflation–as
defined in the text–under optimal policy and perfect information, as well as
the historical peak of inflation during the Great Inflation.
current and expected future interest rates. After the current period rate is
implemented, the underlying model equations (2.2) generate realizations of
the endogenous variables for the next period. The policymakers observe these
values and the process is repeated. As data generating process we will use
both the unrestricted and the unit root version of the model.
In this section we will focus on benchmark values for the policymakers’
preferences. In particular, we set pi∗0 = 2 as in the estimation of the previous
section, and choose a smoothing parameter for HP Filter that yields full sample
Nairu paths comparable to our estimated paths from the previous section. As
benchmark weights in the loss function we choose ωu = ων = 1 so that all
target variables are equally important. As benchmark value for the inflation
bias parameter we set κ0 = 0.87, the estimate Primiceri reports in his analysis.
This value is already very high and precludes much of the motive to surprise
inflate to generate particularly low levels of unemployment. The learning gain
parameter is set to the standard value of γ0 = 0.03, cf. Milani (2005) and
Primiceri (2006). We will investigate changes to each of these parameters in
the next section.
We simulate n = 10, 000 series of inflation and unemployment and inves-
tigate whether they exhibit the high inflation episodes encountered in the US
and the UK during the 1970s.
For convenience, we will denote the quarter in which the inflation reaches
its maximum by t∗. From our discussion of the stylized facts during the great
inflation, we are particularly interested in the highest levels the inflation rate
attains during the simulation, and in the highest value of the unemployment
gap surrounding t∗. Accordingly we gather the highest gap value that occurred
in the period three years before or three years after t∗, and examine how many
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periods pass until the gap reaches its maximum, a positive value reflecting
the situation encountered in the data where unemployment lags inflation. We
will investigate the length of the disinflation period, which we define as the
time that passes until inflation returns from its peak to its target value. A
final focus is on the beliefs around t∗ and the preceding periods. As discussed
in section 2.2, the estimates of inflation persistence are low in the 1960s and
early 1970s, while reaching unity at around t∗. We thus compare the highest
estimates of persistence in the year ending in t∗ with the mean value over
the four preceding years. Similarly, we will analyze the slope of the Phillips
curve. Since it fluctuates stronger and the occurrence of its maximum is more
dispersed than the case of the persistence parameter, we measure the mean
over the last 5 years before t∗ and contrast it to the highest value the perceived
slope attains in the three foregoing years.
In section 2.4.1 we argued that without learning the optimal dynamics can
be expressed as the reduced form 2.9, at least in the case without inflation bias,
i.e. k = 1. From this equation we deduced a critical value of inflation that
will be exceeded in simulations only with a small probability, which we fixed
on 5 percent. Under learning, the simulated paths of inflation will potentially
exceed this critical values with a higher frequency, depending on the dynamics
of the model under learning and the preferences of the policymaker.
We refer to the percentage of simulations with an inflation peak exceeding
our critical value from the no–learning benchmark as the probability of a Great
Inflation. It should be noted that this implicitly sets the probability of a Great
Inflation in the no–learning scenario at five percent. It might be argued that
this is a biased measure since we explicitly allow for an inflation bias, but
our benchmark learning calibration of the relevant parameter is close to one
(κ0 = 0.87) and as we shall see in the next section, our result is only marginally
sensitive to changes in this parameter. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the
inflation peaks. The inflation peaks are high, but with median values between
8.5 and 9 percent in the US model and 11.7 and 12.6 in the UK model fifty
percent of the simulations fall below the inflation rates actually experienced in
the data, which were 11.7 in 1980:1 and 21.6 percent in 1980:3, in the US and
the UK respectively. Only a quarter of the simulations surpass values of 9.9
and 14.2 percent, hence while the simulations of the US model coming close to
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of inflation peaks in the US models (left panels) and
UK models (right panels). The top panels show results from the unrestricted
model, the bottom panels those from the unit root versions.
observed inflation peaks, the UK model is far from explaining the size of the
great inflation in the UK, even if the outcomes are consistently higher than in
the US model. We will discuss this issue in our final section that accounts for
conservative policy behavior in the sense of Blinder (1997).
The probability of a GI is 93.8% percent in the unrestricted US model,
94.5% percent in the unit root US model, and 92.3% and 95.6% in the cor-
responding UK models. It is not surprising that in the unit root model the
simulations result in more pronounced inflation outbreaks since the policy-
maker not only has incomplete information about the stochastic processes, he
also ignores the non–stationarity in his considerations. One might conclude
that the adaptive learning dynamics substantially contribute to explaining the
high levels of inflation, but we are also interested in whether the characteristic
features that jointly occurred in the actual economies are also present in our
simulations.
One important aspect of the GI and the associated disinflation was the
fact that unemployment was brought to high levels relative to the Nairu, the
highest unemployment gaps having been observed at 3.2 and 3.0 percent in
the US and UK time series, 11 and 6 quarters after the inflation peaks (t∗).
This was associated as deliberate policy move to fight the high inflation by
slowing down real activity until inflation was back to acceptable levels. We
are thus also interested in the distribution of the unemployment gap around the
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Quartiles Quartiles
Statistic 1st 2nd 3rd Statistic 1st 2nd 3rd
Inflation Peaks
7.9 8.5 9.4
Persistence0
0.45 0.72 0.85
8.3 9.0 9.9 0.48 0.77 0.90
10.6 11.7 13.1 0.71 0.84 0.90
11.2 12.6 14.2 0.76 0.88 0.94
Gap Peaks
1.9 2.7 3.6
Persistence1
0.92 0.99 1.00
2.5 3.4 4.4 0.97 1.00 1.00
1.9 2.5 3.2 0.93 0.98 1.00
2.0 2.7 3.5 0.97 1.00 1.00
Quarters
4.0 5.0 8.0
Slope0
−0.52 −0.36 −0.20
4.0 5.0 7.0 −0.50 −0.33 −0.19
2.0 3.0 4.0 −0.91 −0.62 −0.45
2.0 3.0 4.0 −0.87 −0.60 −0.46
Disinflation
8.0 13.0 20.0
Slope1
−0.32 −0.16 −0.03
9.0 15.0 22.0 −0.29 −0.14 −0.03
5.0 8.0 13.0 −0.55 −0.38 −0.14
5.0 9.0 16.0 −0.54 −0.38 −0.18
Table 2.3: Summary of simulation results. The table supplies the quartiles
for the variables of interest, where for each the top two lines correspond to
the unrestricted and unit root US model, the bottom two lines contain the
corresponding results from the UK models
inflation peaks. Figure 2.5 offers the corresponding histogram of the size of the
gap, and figure 2.6 depicts the lags between inflation and gap peaks, a positive
value indicating that inflation leads unemployment gaps. The simulations also
yield perceived unemployment gaps peaking after inflation, in line with the
idea that unemployment was raised above the Nairu level in order to bring
inflation back to moderate levels. Table 2.3 provides the relevant statistics in
the rows labelled ‘gap peaks’ and ‘quarters’. The median values attained range
from 2.7 to 3.4 percent in the US simulation covering the historical peak value,
and they occurred 5 quarters after inflation reached its maximum, thus faster
than in the US time series; however, values of 7 and 8 quarters are surpassed
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of unemployment gap peaks in the US models (left
panels) and UK models (right panels). The top panels show results from the
unrestricted model, the bottom panels those from the unit root versions.
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of period between inflation and unemployment peaks
in the US models (left panels) and UK models (right panels). The top panels
show results from the unrestricted model, the bottom panels those from the
unit root versions.
by a quarter of the unrestricted and unit root model simulations. The UK
simulations reached the maximum values of the perceived unemployment gap
substantially earlier then the US counterpart, as we also find in the data. Fifty
percent of the simulations peak before or in the third quarter after the inflation
peak, 75 percent before or in the fourth quarter thereafter, which is slightly
faster than observed in the data.
Another aspect was the rapid disinflation. Inflation continually rose for
almost a decade, but after policy used its instrument to sharply control unem-
ployment rates, it took only a few quarters until the disinflation successfully
ended. We analyze how many quarters where needed until inflation reached
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Figure 2.7: Histogram of duration of the disinflation period in the US models
(left panels) and UK models (right panels). The top panels show results from
the unrestricted model, the bottom panels those from the unit root versions.
its target value, and summarize the results in figure 2.7. US inflation reached
moderate levels (below 3 percent) by the end of 1983, that is 12 quarters af-
ter the t∗, although it took until 1986 until inflation was below 2 percent for
the first time. Our simulations confirm this finding in our US model under
learning, since the disinflation took about 13 to 15 quarters, and even values
of 20 to 22 quarters frequently occurred. UK inflation very quickly came down
to moderate levels about two years after t∗ and remained there thereafter, al-
though it never reached the assumed 2 percent target in the 1980s. The model
simulations yield a similarly rapid disinflation, occurring 8 to 9 periods after
t∗, with a quarter of the simulations exceeding disinflation periods of 13 and
16 quarters length. We thus find that our simulations replicate the size and
timing of historically observed unemployment gaps.
We argued that a crucial determinant of the great inflation outbreak was
the evolution of beliefs about inflation persistence. It was low during the
periods before the rise of inflation and with inflation approaching its maximum
became closer to unity. The left panels of figure 2.8 plot the mean value
of persistence over the four years preceding t∗ and the right panels plot the
highest estimates in the year ending in t∗ for the US and UK simulations. The
respective top panel corresponds to the unrestricted model, the bottom panel
to the unit root version. Note that the ordinate is cropped in the right panels
for expositional purposes: the majority of persistence estimates at the heights
of the GI equals unity, though some values are still slightly below. Since the
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Figure 2.8: Histogram of perceived inflation persistence before and during the
great inflation in the US models (left panels) and UK models (right panels).
The top panels show results from the unrestricted model, the bottom panels
those from the unit root versions.
histogram value at unity is ten times as large as at the remaining values, the
ordinate values between 75 and 425 are cut, the only bar exceeding any of
these two values being the outer right one at unity. We thus see that while
the average estimates of inflation persistence are dispersed around low values
(left panels) this perception sharply changes at the time of the inflation peak
where most estimates indicate the near unit root property of the inflation
series. Thus, as we already discussed for US and UK data, our simulations
show a sharp and sudden increase of perceived persistence on the outbreak of
the great inflation. Table 2.3 summarized this finding: the entries in the rows
‘persistence0’ show that fifty percent of the simulations generated beliefs about
this parameter in the ranges 0.45–0.85 (unrestricted US model) and 0.48–0.90
(unit root US model), as well as 0.71–0.90 (unrestricted UK model) and 0.76–
0.94 (unit root UK model), whereas 75 percent exceeded values around 0.92
(unrestricted models) and 0.97 (unit root model), and 50 percent were almost
unity, as summarized by the rows labelled ‘persistence1’.
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As inflation rose the estimates of the Phillips curve slope were shown to be
adjusted to nearly ineffective values. The same phenomenon also occurs in our
simulations, though less pronounced: while the perceived slope has substan-
tial (negative) values in the years preceding t∗, most estimates drop to almost
zero when inflation reaches its peak. Figure 2.9 shows the distributions of per-
ceived slope parameters, again the respective top panel depicts results from
the unrestricted model, and the bottom panel refers to to unit root version of
our model. The left panel contains histograms of the slope prior to the great
inflation in period t∗, the right panels show how the perception changed in the
periods around t∗. Evidently, the slope perceptions were distributed around
relatively high negative values, but as inflation continuously rose until reach-
ing its peak at t∗, policymakers became more and more sceptical about their
ability to fight inflation via their impact on real activity. A substantial number
of simulated slope estimates approaches zero, thus negating any influence of
changes in the unemployment gap on inflation. Nevertheless, many estimates
remain different from zero, a fact that is also reflected in the summary statis-
tics contained in the rows ‘slope0’ and ‘slope1’ of table 2.3, which support the
finding that the estimates became less favorable, but also document that the
many estimates still remained non–zero.
2.5. Sensitivity Analysis
Our previous analysis focussed on a single type of policymaker character-
ized by our benchmark calibration. We will now investigate to what extend
our results generalize in face of arbitrary policy preferences or changes in the
modelling of the learning mechanism. Instead of repeating the full analysis of
the preceding section we will concentrate on summary statistics in dependence
of key variables, in particular we will pay attention to the quartiles of the
relevant magnitudes, as listed in table 2.3 in the benchmark exercise. Besides
the three policy parameters we shall also explore the role of the gain parame-
ter in the learning algorithm and the parameter of the Hodrick–Prescott filter
applied by the policymaker to extract the Nairu.
We analyze how these changes in preference or learning parameters changes
our key results, the inflation peak, the highest unemployment gap attained
to convey a disinflation, the length of the disinflation period, the number of
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Figure 2.9: Histogram of perceived Phillips curve slope before and during the
great inflation in the US models (left panels) and UK models (right panels).
The top panels show results from the unrestricted model, the bottom panels
those from the unit root versions.
period the gap lags or leads the inflation peak, and the probability that a
Great Inflation period occurs given policymakers face imperfect knowledge.
It might well be the case that policymakers with different preferences or
learning algorithms would not be confronted with GI type episodes, so that
the historical high–inflation periods could have been avoided by resorting to
a more appropriate policy stance. However, as it turns out, all optimizing
policymakers would have found themselves trapped in a GI had they faced
imperfect knowledge, at least with a very high probability. Thus in addition
to the finding of the previous section that demonstrated that a GI is likely
to arise under the requirement to learn about the economic environment, the
results of this section support the notion that imperfect knowledge as such
is the source of these disastrous economic outcomes, and not any particular
specification of preferences.
Considering different weights on unemployment stabilization. Fig-
ure 2.10 as well as the corresponding ones in the following sensitivity exercises
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Figure 2.10: Inflation peaks (top panel) and Peaks of the Unemployment Gap
(bottom panel) for different weights on unemployment stabilization
contain the first, second and third quartiles of inflation and the unemployment
gap depending on the parameter in question–here the weight on unemployment
stabilization, for both the unrestricted model, which are depicted as thick lines,
as well as those for the unit root model, which are depicted as shaded regions.
The resulting maximum unemployment gap under optimal policy is little
affected by a change in the relative weight on unemployment stabilization,
although the curves have negative slope, as expected: the higher the weight
on unemployment stabilization relative to inflation the lower is the resulting
maximum deviation in unemployment from the (perceived) Nairu. Reconsid-
ering the inflation peaks, this may seem puzzling, since the differences in the
resulting inflation peaks are more pronounced. This can be explained in light
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Figure 2.11: Policymakers’ perceptions of inflation persistence and Phillips
curve slope before and at the height of the GI for different weights on unem-
ployment stabilization
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of the evolution of the perceptions of the Phillips curve slope, θ(1): inspection
of figure 2.11 reveals that close to the Great Inflation we observe a drop in the
(absolute value of) the slope, that is, as in the benchmark case, policymakers
substantially revise their slope estimate only a few quarters before the peak of
the GI, and with higher weights on unemployment stabilization this estimate
becomes more and more pessimistic. The reason for this might be the inter-
action with the Nairu misperception: the more reluctant the policymaker is
to inducing movements in the unemployment rate the more likely it becomes
that deviations in real activity are soaked up by movements in the underly-
ing Nairu although – crucially – the policymaker is not aware of this due to
his poor Nairu estimates; hence, a policymaker that operates with relatively
low levels of (perceived) unemployment gaps is more likely to find his actions
phasing out without any substantial effect on inflation, hence forcing him to
revise his slope estimate towards less effective values. The top panel of figure
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Figure 2.12: Periods that unemployment peak lags inflation peaks (top panel),
duration of disinflation and probability of a GI for different weights on unem-
ployment stabilization
2.12 summarizes the number of periods that the peak of the unemployment
gap lags the peak of inflation, with negative numbers representing a lead of
unemployment gap peaks. Again, the thick lines correspond to the results from
the unrestricted model, the shaded regions to those in the unit root model.
The results clearly indicate that the unemployment gap lags inflation with a
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five period delay in the US and with a three period delay in the UK, regardless
of the choice of the weighting parameter. Similarly, the panels in the middle
reflect the number of periods that are needed to bring inflation back to its
target value. In the US, the duration of this disinflation period increases from
a median value of 10 quarters to 20 quarters as unemployment stabilization be-
comes relatively more important. In the UK, this increase is less pronounced.
Starting from 10 quarters for a low weight on unemployment stabilization of
ωu = 0.25, the disinflation takes 12 quarters for a high weight of ωu = 4. The
bottom panels depict our measure of the probability of a Great Inflation. As
might be expected, the higher the relative weight the policymaker attaches to
unemployment, the higher is the risk of high inflation periods. However, the
occurrence of a Great Inflation is very likely, given the high values above 90
percent and in many cases even 100 percent. The quartiles are very close to
each other and would be difficult to distinguish visually and therefore we only
present the median values.
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Figure 2.13: Inflation peaks (top panel) and Peaks of the Unemployment Gap
(bottom panel) for different weights on interest rate smoothing
Results for varying degrees of the interest rate smoothing com-
ponent. Since with higher values of the interest smoothing weight the poli-
cymaker is more reluctant to use its instrument to fight inflation the resulting
inflation peaks are increasing in this parameter, as well as the time until in-
flation is brought back to target, cf. figures 2.13 and 2.15. Besides that the
remaining results are not different to those in the benchmark simulation: the
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highest deviation of unemployment from the Nairu occurs a few quarters after
the inflation peak, after one to one and a half year later in the US model and
about a year later in the UK model. The perceived values of inflation per-
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Figure 2.14: Policymakers’ perceptions of inflation persistence and Phillips
curve slope before and at the height of the GI for different weights on interest
rate smoothing
sistence increase from below 0.8 in the periods before the GI to unity at the
time of the GI, and the slope estimates are reduced (in absolute terms) to low
values θ(1) ≈ −0.1 (US) and θ(1) ≈ −0.5 (UK) from previously more effective
levels, θ(1) ≈ −0.4 (US) and θ(1) ≈ −0.7 (UK). This pattern is roughly the
same for all smoothing weights under consideration. Not surprisingly, although
the probability of a GI occurring is high for all values, it is even higher for a
relatively greater weight on the smoothing component.
Sensitivity of results for different degrees of inflation bias. Our
benchmark used a value close to one thus almost eliminating the desire to
attain unusually low unemployment rates. In this section we consider a grid
over the interval [0.5, 1] with step size 0.1, conduct n = 1, 000 simulations for
each point, and present the quartiles of the key statistics in the subsequent
figures.
The economic intuition of the inflation bias parameter κ is that the policy-
maker acts in such a way that economic outcomes feature unnecessarily high
inflation with no gain in real performance. Consequently, for low values we
would expect inflation peaking at higher levels with the unemployment gap
peaks remaining unaffected. The first part of this presumption is confirmed by
figure 2.16. Indeed, across all variations considered in this section, the infla-
tion bias parameter κ has the greatest effect on inflation outcomes. However,
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Figure 2.15: Periods that unemployment peak lags inflation peaks (top panel),
duration of disinflation and probability of a GI for different weights on interest
rate smoothing
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Figure 2.16: Inflation peaks (top panel) and Peaks of the Unemployment Gap
(bottom panel) for different degrees of inflation bias
while according to our intuition the UK gap is unaffected by changes in κ, US
unemployment is brought to higher levels relative to the Nairu for low values
of κ. Overall, the effect of κ on the gap is less pronounced than on inflation.
A striking difference is the substantially prolonged disinflation period in the
US model. This, too, does not come unexpected, as a policymaker focussing
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Figure 2.17: Policymakers’ perceptions of inflation persistence and Phillips
curve slope before and at the height of the GI for different degrees of inflation
bias
on the real part of the economy will tend to require more quarters to disinflate
more smoothly.
Finally it should be noted that for a high inflation bias (low κ) the proba-
bility of a GI reaches 100 percent, that is the more a central bank is tempted
to push unemployment below the Nairu the more likely it induces unusually
high inflation if it is simultaneously learning about the dynamics of the econ-
omy. For κ approaching one, the probability of unusually high inflation rates
rapidly decreases, but still remains high for a learning policymaker without
the temptation to surprise inflate the economy.
This temptation seems to be absent in our models anyways. The reason we
included the inflation bias parameter κ was to account for a Barro and Gordon
(1983)–type motivation of the policymaker to deliver surprises in the inflation
rate which would result in below average unemployment rates if agents would
not erode this temptation by adjusting their expectations accordingly. Hence,
we would expect the unemployment gap that the policymaker wishes to reduce
to lead inflation which would be the tool used to reach this goal in this model.
Our results, however, indicate that inflation is the problem that is solved by
pushing unemployment above the Nairu, thus resulting in gap peaks lagging
inflation, as confirmed by figure 2.18.
Considering different learning algorithms. The gain value reflects
two opposing forces: one is the desire to put higher weights on more recent
observations to improve estimates in presence of structural breaks; in this re-
gard higher gain values perform better, given that the learning dynamics are
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Figure 2.18: Periods that unemployment peak lags inflation peaks (top panel),
duration of disinflation and probability of a GI for different degrees of inflation
bias
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Figure 2.19: Inflation peaks (top panel) and Peaks of the Unemployment Gap
(bottom panel) for different learning gain parameters γ
substantial as discussed earlier; the other is the desire to use sufficient sample
information; if the gain value is too high there are effectively too few observa-
tions included in the estimates. The accord in the learning literature is on a
gain value of γ = 0.03, but values around this particular value are equally rea-
sonable. Specifically, we allow for gain values in the range [0, 0.06]. It should
be noted, that with our non–recursive, discounted least squares formulation, a
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zero gain coincides with ordinary least squares, cf. appendix A.1, so our anal-
ysis nests all relevant learning specifications. While the economic outcomes
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Figure 2.20: Policymakers’ perceptions of inflation persistence and Phillips
curve slope before and at the height of the GI for different learning gain pa-
rameters γ
(inflation and gap peaks) are largely unaffected by the gain value, the per-
ceptions of inflation persistence and Phillips curve slope are more pronounced
for higher gain parameters. This reflects the fact that the economic conditions
surrounding the height of the GI are causal for the changes in these key param-
eters and higher gain values place a higher weight on these more recent events.
Since this favors the emergence of the GI, its probability slightly increases in
the gain parameter.
More importantly though, changes in the learning algorithm has no notable
impact on our findings. It is thus not the particular way we model learning,
but the accounting for imperfect knowledge as such that drives our results.
Robustness versus different assumptions on Nairu smoothness.
We choose a value for filter parameter the policymaker uses to extract the
Nairu that reproduces the smoothness in the Nairu as documented in empirical
studies. However, our insights should not depend crucially on this choice, so
it is important to assess its relevance for our findings. In figures 2.22 – 2.24
we plot our key results against an exponent c, such that the HP parameter
is given by µ = 10c. The smallest value under consideration, c = 3.2, is such
that it implies the standard calibration µ = 1600, but we include higher values
which imply Nairu paths comparable to those typically reported in the related
literature.
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Figure 2.21: Periods that unemployment peak lags inflation peaks (top panel),
duration of disinflation and probability of a GI for different learning gains γ
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Figure 2.22: Inflation peaks (top panel) and Peaks of the Unemployment Gap
(bottom panel) for different HP Filter smoothing parameters
The results with different HP parameters µ yield useful insights in the
mechanism regarding the Nairu misperceptions. A high smoothing parameter
implies a rather flat path for the Nairu. As the gap is determined as the
difference of unemployment to the Nairu, the fluctuations in unemployment
are soaked up by the perceived gap. Conversely, a low µ allows the Nairu to
take much of the variation in unemployment, leaving little movement left for
the gap. Thus, higher smoothing parameter imply gap estimates with higher
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amplitudes. What eventually matters is the relation of amplitudes in the
perceived and the true gap. If for a given choice of µ the policymaker would
obtain a good approximation to the true gap, then increases in the smoothness
parameter would result in excessively high amplitudes in the perceived gap.
With the true gap unaffected the policymaker would believe that changes in
the gap, though of big size, have not that big of an effect. This effect is stronger
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Figure 2.23: Policymakers’ perceptions of inflation persistence and Phillips
curve slope before and at the height of the GI for different HP Filter smoothing
parameters
for the UK model where the true Nairu fluctuations are higher compared to the
US model, Gordon (1997) and Greenslade et al. (2003). A low HP smoothing
value in the UK model extracts a gap whose fluctuations are small in size
and hence agree with the true gap. The reason that this effect appears hardly
present in the US simulation is that the true Nairu is relatively flat and thus the
gap has a high amplitude. Either the policymaker uses also a high µ yielding
gap estimates corresponding to the true gap, or he chooses low values yielding
an estimated gap path being smaller in amplitude than the true gap, but then
he would observe small changes in the gap exerting already substantial effect
on inflation.
This is reflected in the graph plotting the perceived slope against the HP
parameter. The US slope estimates are increasing, approaching zero from
below, in the HP parameter but not as strongly as in the UK case. Besides
that, both models display the same behavior, with the realized maximum gap
values admitted by the policymaker to disinflate being higher when the time
variation in the gap is considered high, i.e. for high µ. The inflation peaks are
little affected by this choice, as are the perceptions of inflation persistence, the
speed of the disinflation and the probability of an inflation outbreak. Hence
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the insights gained in the benchmark simulations carry over to arbitrary values
of the filter parameter.
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Figure 2.24: Inflation peaks (top panel) and Peaks of the Unemployment Gap
(bottom panel) for different HP Filter smoothing parameters
2.6. Learning with a conservative policymaker
We have seen that policymakers with restricted information sets will almost
inevitably face inflationary outbreaks as experienced during the GI. However,
while optimizing policy leads to unusually high levels of inflation, it does rarely
produce outcomes as bad as those experienced in the UK, and in part this holds
true for the US case as well.
In our companion paper we argued that the uncertainty of the estimates
suggests a Brainard (1967) type moderate policy stance, which implies the
muted policy setting we documented in chapter 1. As argued by Brainard and
Blinder (1997) high standard deviations of key parameters induce the decision
maker to compute the optimal response under certainty and then implement
only a fraction of it, a feature Blinder coined policy conservatism.
We thus examine the standard deviations of the policymakers’ estimates,
depicted in figure 2.25. As can be seen, during the great inflation the uncer-
tainty was substantially higher than in the subsequent periods. Notably the
Phillips slope estimates until the early 1980s are very imprecise, a fact that is
particularly pronounced in the UK model, thus calling for an especially mute
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Standard Errors in the US model Standard Errors in the UK model
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Figure 2.25: Uncertainty of Beliefs in the US (left panel) and UK model (right).
Measured by the standard deviations of inflation persistence and of the Phillips
curve slope (dashed line).
interest response. This matches the finding in our companion paper, that doc-
uments highly positive comovement of historical and optimal interest rates but
with a magnitude being persistently below recommended values.
Our modelling strategy was to derive optimal policy decisions of a learn-
ing central banker, but we followed the standard approach that focusses on
decision making under certainty equivalence. The crucial feature of adaptive
learning is the time variation that is due to perpetual refinement of model esti-
mates, but these estimates are surrounded by uncertainty. In the same way the
estimates might change, converging to true underlying values, the associated
uncertainty will also change, probably decrease over time. Thus, a learning
policymaker that takes multiplicative uncertainty a` la Brainard (1967) into
account will behave conservative, but less and less so as he eventually learns
the true parameter values and becomes more and more confident about them.
To assess whether a conservative optimizing policymaker would reproduce the
bad historical outcomes, we construct a simulation exercise that accounts for
the observed phenomenon.
Sack (2000) analyzes Brainard’s ideas in a dynamic, infinite horizon model.
He proposes a method that allows a reformulation of the decision problem un-
der multiplicative uncertainty in terms of a certainty equivalence problem with
a modified loss function. He expresses his results in general terms allowing for
a constant in the transition law and the loss functions, but since the constant
can always be included in the state vector as in our example, we can simplify
his terms determining the optimal instrument setting. In the setup of our
optimal linear regulator problem, as discussed in appendices A.2 and A.3, he
demonstrates that under certainty as well as under uncertainty, the optimal
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instrument i is set as
(2.10) it = −(B′ΛB)−1B′ΛAyt.
The only difference between both cases is that the matrix Λ solves a differ-
ent Lyapunov equation. In the certainty case the solution to this equation
depends on the weighting matrix in the policymakers loss function, which we
labelled Q∗. Sacks result now reduces to the finding that the solution under
uncertainty given a weighting scheme Q∗ denoted by Λu(Q∗), relates to the
certainty equivalence solution as
(2.11) Λu(Q
∗) = Λ(Q∗ + Σ∗).
That is, one obtains the solution matrix for the uncertainty case by computing
the certainty equivalence solution for a problem where a matrix Σ∗ adds to
the loss function’s weighting matrix. Σ∗ collects the covariances between the
uncertain parameters. As Blinder argues, Brainard’s analysis focusses on the
special case with zero covariances between different parameters, so Σ∗ would be
diagonal. However, Sack’s result then suggests that in his framework Brainard
type uncertainty can be accounted for by modifying the weights in the loss
function. But changes in these weights will alter the way the decision maker
balances his target variables and thus the whole paths of them. Except in
special cases this will result in policies that are not necessarily correlated and
scaled down as in Brainard’s static setup. Sack’s dynamic analysis thus yields
more general results, and for that matter, we already analyzed the effect of
uncertainty implicitly, by investigating changes to the loss function’s weight in
the previous section.
Instead, we proceed by stipulating that policymaker’s were intrigued by
Brainard’s recommendation, which just came up at the time of the great in-
flation, and decided to account for the high uncertainty of their estimates by
muting their response as suggested by his considerations. We model this by
computing the optimal interest rate response and then scaling it down, just as
a Brainard type policymaker would do. We allow this down scaling for the his-
torical great inflation periods, which we limit to the 1970s, and choose a scale
factor given by the ratio of historical to optimal interest rates as documented
in chapter 1 (cf. table 1.1 there).
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Figure 2.26: Inflation rates induced by a central banker constrained to behave
conservative in face of high estimation uncertainty.
We draw n = 200 random shock sequences and use our benchmark policy
calibration to generate interest rate paths of a conservative policymaker under
imperfect knowledge who is otherwise behaving optimally. Figure 2.26 depicts
the simulated paths of inflation and contrasts them with the historical time
series. Apart from the first peak in the inflation rate, which is commonly at-
tributed to the oil price shock, and therefore to the bad luck factor that we
ruled out in our simulations, the similarity of simulated paths to historical
inflation rates is striking. The simulations do not only capture the expanded
increase in inflation, the extend of its duration, but they yield inflation peaks
almost coinciding with observed data. The simulations consistently point at
an inflationary outbreak of exactly the dimension, duration and extend ex-
perienced in the US and the UK. Furthermore, the disinflation is as rapid as
documented in empirical accounts. We thus conclude that conservative behav-
ior plays a crucial role, and should be accounted for in the empirical analysis
of models under adaptive learning.
2.7. Conclusions
We pursued the question whether the Great Inflation as experienced in the
US and UK can be reconciled with optimal policy under imperfect informa-
tion. We started from initial beliefs determined from data prior to 1960 and
required the central banker to jointly learn about the parameters of a reduced
form New Keynesian model and to infer estimates about the unobservable un-
employment gap. We saw that this inevitably pushes him into a combination
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of substantially underestimated levels of the Nairu, very low values of inflation
persistence and favorable slope coefficients of the Phillips curve.
The initial rise in inflation thus calls for no immediate reaction. Inflation is
not persistent, hence any shock to it will fade out sufficiently fast. Unemploy-
ment, however, is perceived to be best held at low levels, which in retrospect
unfolded inflationary pressures without observers identifying this source, and
low deviations from the Nairu appear effective enough to counteract inflation.
As inflation reaches high levels, agents realize its persistent nature and
correspondingly conclude that tight inflation control is in order. However,
since the misperception in the gap variable–the real time perception of the
gap was substantially positive while the true gap was close to zero–falsely lead
agents to the insight that even substantial gap values do not release tension
in the inflation rate. Thus at the outbreak of the great inflation, interest
movements appear to have a limited effect.
As soon as sufficient movement in unemployment allows for a more precise
detection of the Nairu and a clearer assessment of the Phillips curve slope, the
policymaker pushes unemployment over the true Nairu until inflation quickly
returns to moderate values. At this point the unemployment gap is also allowed
to fade out. The simulations confirm the duration of the disinflation period
and the lags that are necessary for unemployment to exceed the Nairu.
These evolutions in beliefs and the associated stylized facts as summarized
above are consistently reproduced in simulations of the system under learning.
Our finding is true for any type of optimizing policymaker from a wide range
of preferences and it applies equally well to the US and the UK. The difference
in both models is the substantially higher uncertainty surrounding the slope
coefficient in the UK model, inducing the policymaker to act more conserva-
tive. Indeed, modelling a Brainard type central banker that implements only
a fraction, that is decreasing in uncertainty, of optimal interest rates produces
outcomes almost identical to the great inflation episodes in both countries,
being comparable in the duration of the periods of increasing and subsequent
sustained high inflation, the rapid disinflation, as well as the dimension of the
high rates experienced in both countries.
We therefore find support for the notion of adaptive learning in inflation
unemployment dynamics, and provide a better account for one of the most
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important periods in US and UK postwar inflation history. Our considerations
also point to a substantial role to uncertainty in empirical models of adaptive
learning, which we leave as a future research project.
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CHAPTER 3
Estimating DSGE models under Adaptive Learning
3.1. Introduction
Over the last decade, microfounded dynamic stochastic equilibrium (DSGE)
models have become the main tool of macroeconomic analysis. The New Key-
nesian model analyzed in Woodford’s (2003) monograph and in Clarida et al.’s
(2000) prominent contribution, too name only a few, is one of the most im-
portant contributions to monetary economics. Consequently, many authors
estimate versions of these models, usually based on the rational expectations
(RE) hypothesis. While this approach is very fruitful there has recently been
an important branch of research that replaces this informationally demand-
ing approach with adaptive learning (AL), where agents still act optimally
but face imperfect knowledge of the economic structure. Ireland (2003) calls
for irrational expectations econometrics that account for restricted informa-
tion sets. As a response to this call, this paper offers a general approach to
analyze DSGE models under adaptive learning, enabling researchers to con-
trast corresponding results with the rational expectations benchmark. This
method extends the standard estimation procedure by incorporating results
from Evans and Honkapohja (2001) into the analysis. The second part of the
paper applies this procedure to Ireland’s (2004) assessment of the New Key-
nesian model amended with real business type technology shocks. Estimation
of his model under adaptive learning gives a better fit to US data then the RE
benchmark and yields substantially different insights.
3.2. The basic approach
Microfounded models incorporating dynamic and forward looking elements
have become the standard tool of macroeconomic analysis. The associated first
order as well as the market clearing conditions and relations describing prefer-
ences and technologies give rise to a set of equations that must be satisfied in
equilibrium. These equations link current and past realizations of endogenous
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variables to their expected future values and exogenous shocks. Formally, we
can write such a dynamic model of the economy as
(3.1) EtF (y˜t+1, y˜t, y˜t−1, ε˜t, ε˜t−1; Ψ) = 0
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on date–t information, the
mapping F summarizes the model equations involving the endogenous vector y˜
and the exogenous terms ε˜. The vector Ψ collects all parameters of the model.
To analyze such an economy the mapping is typically log–linearized around
the deterministic steady state, which is implicitly defined by the rest point of
the system y¯ given no more shocks are ever to occur,
(3.2) F (y¯, y¯, y¯, 0, 0; Ψ) = 0
and is reformulated in terms of log deviations from steady state values, yt =
log(y˜t)− log(y¯) and εt = log(ε˜t)
Log linearizing the mapping F yields
(3.3) F ' Jac(F )diag(y¯, y¯, y¯, ξ¯)(yt+1, yt, yt−1, εt, εt−1)′
Together with (3.1) this yields the canonical linear structural form
(3.4) yt = Γ1Etyt+1 + Γ2yt−1 + Γ3εt
with the shock vector having possibly the autoregressive representation
(3.5) εt = Λεt−1 + ξt
In this formulation, all matrix entries are functions of the underlying deep
parameters Ψ, as captured by the Jacobian matrix Jac(F ) and the steady
state values given by the diagonal matrix appearing in (3.3). The vector ξ is
serially and intertemporally uncorrelated white noise, i.e. E[ξj,tξk,s] = σ
2
j only
for j = k and t = s and zero otherwise.
Standard solution methods, e.g. Sims (2002), Klein (2000) or Uhlig (1995),
yield a reduced form representation
(3.6) yt = Θ1yt−1 + Θ2εt.
This representation along with the noise equation is subsequently mapped into
an appropriate state space form, for which the likelihood can be evaluated using
the standard Kalman Filter. The underlying structural parameters Ψ can then
be estimated by the maximum likelihood method.
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The mapping to a state space form is commonly necessary due to the
presence of unobservable variables. Hence we will consider this mapping onto
a general state space form
mt = Mst +Xmxt +Mζζ(3.7a)
st = Sst−1 +Xsxt + Sζζ(3.7b)
where it is important to note that all matrices are functions of Ψ. The Kalman
Filter computes a set of recursive equations in the one period ahead forecast
of the measurement and state vectors m and s and in the corresponding fore-
cast errors’ covariance matrices, Υ and Σ, which can be used to evaluate the
likelihood associated with the underlying parameter vector.
To summarize, for a given parameter vector Ψ we compute the linearized
structural form (Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,Λ) which by standard RE reasoning implies an equi-
librium representation (Θ1,Θ2,Λ) as given by equation 3.6. To estimate this
latter system, it is mapped onto a time invariant state space form (3.7), mainly
due to the need to distinguish observable from unobservable variables. Each
vector Ψ thus induces a unique time invariant state space form and with it a
unique likelihood value. Standard optimization routines1 can then be used to
infer the maximum likelihood estimate Ψ∗T of the structural parameters from
a sample of length T .
3.3. Agents’ beliefs and implied dynamics
To extend the basic procedure to deal also with the adaptive learning hy-
pothesis, we introduce the concept of the T–map relating the perceived law of
motion (PLM) and the actual law of motion (ALM), as defined by Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).
The PLM captures the model dynamics as perceived by the agents. It
is clear, that many variations are possible here, but the standard approach
as suggested by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) is to endow the agents with
a model of the same functional form as the equilibrium representation (3.6),
1Sims’s (2002) Matlab code csminwel offers an appropriate and commonly applied
algorithm.
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thus the PLM takes the recursive form
yt = Ω1yt−1 + Ω2εt(3.8)
εt = Ω3εt−1 + ξt(3.9)
with Ω1, Ω2 and Ω3 not necessarily coinciding with their rational expectations
equilibrium counterparts Θ1, Θ2 and Λ. Given a PLM of this form, agents
forecasting model is given by
(3.10) Etyt+1 = Ω
2
1yt−1 + (Ω1Ω2 + Ω2Ω3)εt
The underlying structural form (3.4) maps the agents’ forecast model into an
actual law of motion
(3.11) yt = (Γ1Ω
2
1 + Γ2)yt−1 + (Γ1(Ω1Ω2 + Ω2Ω3) + Γ3)εt
That is the beliefs of the agents, parameterized by the matrices (Ω1,Ω2,Ω3)
are mapped onto actual transition matrices. The mapping is usually referred
to as the T–map, and is given in our terminology by
(3.12) T :

Ω1
Ω2
Ω3
 7→

Γ1Ω
2
1 + Γ2
Γ1(Ω1Ω2 + Ω2Ω3) + Γ3
Λ

The consistency condition under rational expectations where agents have
perfect information requires their forecast model (PLM) to coincide with the
induced dynamics of the model (ALM), hence the RE equilibrium can be char-
acterized as the fixed point of the T–map. Solution algorithms as suggested by
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and extended by Klein (2000), Sims (2002) and
others solve this fixed point problem.
For completeness we note that many studies in the AL literature focus on
whether agents who initially use a PLM different from the REE fixed point
will ever learn the equilibrium parameters despite the fact that their misper-
ceived forecast model crucially feeds back into the dynamics of the model.
Given that they use consistent estimators such as OLS, Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) show that a necessary and sufficient condition is the stability of
an associated continuous time differential equation depending solely on the T–
mapping. This boils down to inspecting the eigenvalues of Jac(T ) and verifying
whether these have real parts less than unity. This is a standard condition in
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the theory of ordinary differential equations, and yields equations which can
be checked numerically or in simple cases even analytically. Thus, the T–map
serves in determining whether the additional dynamics introduced by learning
will eventually fade out bringing the economy into its full information rational
expectations equilibrium. However, we will use the T–map to track the feed-
back introduced by learning agents, so we will be able to use data series and
estimate a DSGE model under the assumption of adaptively learning agents.
3.4. Estimation of PLM
We shall first discuss how estimation proceeds given a sequence of PLMs
that agents have estimated over time, while discussing later how this sequence
is actually generated. So suppose that since date t0 agents have at each date
reestimated their model of the economy in order to enable forecast of relevant
variables. This yields a sequence of perceived models, {Ω1,t,Ω2,t,Ω3,t}Tt=t0 .
Since agents base their forecasts Eˆtyt+1 for each date t on the corresponding
estimates, the actual dynamic evolution of the economy at date t is parame-
terized by T (Ω1,t,Ω2,t,Ω3,t).
VAR approach. The vector autoregression (VAR) approach simply as-
sumes that agents use a VAR model as PLM (3.8). This means that standard
VAR estimation yields estimates for the PLM matrices. The VAR approach
has the advantage that dynamics present in the data but not captured by our
stylized model are taken account of. Furthermore, it is a simple approach that
does not require deep understanding of the underlying model. Unfortunately,
the VAR method requires all variables to be observable, which in general is
not true. So agents might want to define appropriate proxies for unobservable
variables prior to estimation, e.g. detrending real output to obtain a measure
of the output gap.
Model consistent approach. As an alternative we might assume that
agents impose more structure on their forecast model than in a simple VAR.
While the VAR approach only requires agents to behave individually optimal
and tackling their forecast problem in a convenient but simplifying way, one
might also stipulate that they know the structure of the nonlinear aggregate
dynamic relations, though not its exact parametric specification. Thus we
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might as well assume that in each period they perform the full DSGE es-
timation under rational expectations, which accounts for all cross equation
restrictions imposed by the model. This yields a sequence of deep parameters
that evolve over time, and with them a sequence of forecast models, derived via
the relations described above, i.e. agents plug the deep parameter estimates
into the model equations, log–linearize and solve the structural model for a
reduced form difference equation that they can use to form forecasts. Since
this approach respects the model equations and embodies learning only insofar
as it reflects the time variation in parameter estimates, we label this procedure
the model consistent approach.
3.5. Application to Ireland’s model
Ireland (2004) develops a New Keynesian model which explicitly accounts
for real business type technology shocks. The goal is to assess its importance
relative to the three types of shocks which are usually investigated in this
framework, a preference shock, a cost push shock and a monetary policy shock.
The model is mapped onto an econometrically usable form and estimated for
US data. For convenience, we briefly review the key building blocks of the
model and discuss its main difference to the standard model.
The model. Ireland’s (2004) model features a representative household
who maximizes a discounted, infinite stream of single–period money–in–the
utility preferences
(3.13) E
∑
t≥0
βt[at logCt + logMt/Pt − hηt /η]
subject to the budget constraint
(3.14) Mt−1 +Bt−1 + Tt +Wtht +Dt ≥ PtCt +Bt/rt +Mt.
Finished good consumption Ct and real money balances Mt/Pt enter as log-
arithms while hours work ht have an elasticity of ω ≡ 1/η. Agents allocate
their nominal wealth consisting of their wage receipts Wtht and their stock of
previously accumulated money and bonds Mt−1 + Bt−1 to consumption PtCt
and a portfolio of money Mt and bonds worth Bt in the next period given an
interest rate rt. One of the first–order conditions of the agent’s problem is
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given by
hη−1t =
at
Ct
Wt
Pt
.(3.15)
The variable at is a log–AR(1) preference shock, that makes consumption more
attractive. A positive realization of this shock induces agents to work more in
order to increase wage income for consumption purposes. The responsiveness
of labor supply increases with the elasticity parameter ω. A further first–order
condition relates current and future consumption,
(3.16)
at
Ct
= βEt
( at+1
Ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
)
that is if e.g. the expected future preference shock exceeds the current shock,
consumption is shifted from today towards tomorrow. The preference shock
thus impacts on the intertemporal relation of the consumption stream (NO,
cancels out if AR1!) as well as the intratemporal consumption–labor decision,
where the latter is governed by the elasticity of labor ω. It will turn out that
the latter parameter and the size of this shock play a major role in US data.
There is a competitive final goods sector facing a constant returns to scale
technology
(3.17) Yt ≤
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
(θt−1)/θt
)θt/(θt−1)
where the parameter θt plays the role of a stochastic markup or cost–push
shock. The underlying stochastic process is also assumed to be a first–order
AR(1). Intermediate goods producers, distributed over the unit interval and
indexed by i, are monopolistically competitive firms, also facing a constant
returns to scale technology
(3.18) Yt(i) ≤ ztht(i), i ∈ [0, 1]
where z is an RBC type unit root technology shock. Intermediate goods firms
face Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment cost
(3.19)
φ
2
(
Pt(i)
piPt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Yt
This term punishes changes in individual prices unless the change corresponds
to the steady state inflation rate. Therefore the reaction to shocks will be
smoothed out over several periods inducing less flexible prices.
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The model is closed by specifying that the central bank sets the nominal
interest rate rt by following a version of Taylor’s (1993) rule, including output
growth gt (a hat indicates deviations from steady state values)
(3.20) rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + ρpipˆit + ρggˆt + ρxxˆt + εrt
Ireland proposes the use of a difference rule, thus fixing the inertial parameter
in the rule ρr = 1. εr is a shock to this interest rate rule reflecting non–systemic
deviations.
This model differs to the standard New Keynesian model as developed by
Woodford (2003) and discussed e.g. by Clarida et al. (2000) in the introduction
of the technology shock zt. The log–linearized first order conditions are given
by
xt = αxxt−1 + (1− αx)Etxt+1 − (rt − Etpit+1) + (1− ω)(1− ρa)at(3.21)
pit = βαpipit−1 + β(1− αpi)Etpit+1 + ψxt − et(3.22)
gt = yt − yt−1 + zt(3.23)
xt = yt − ωat(3.24)
rt = ρrrt−1 + ρpipit + ρggt + ρxxt + εrt(3.25)
which using Ireland’s notation st = (yt−1, rt−1, pit−1, gt−1, xt−1, pit, xt)′ can be
rewritten in compact matrix notation as
(3.26) C0st = C1st−1 + C2Etst+1 + C3vt
where the C–matrices collect the parameters of equations (3.21)–(3.25).
(3.27) st = Γ1Etst+1 + Γ2st−1 + Γ3vt
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with
Γ1 =
1
∆

ρg −ρr −ρpiβαpi 0 αx
−ρg ρr ρpiβαpi 0 αx(ρg + ρpiψ + ρx)
ψρg −ψρg βαpi(1 + ρg + ρx) 0 ψαx
−1 + ρpiψ + ρx −ρr −ρpiβαpi 0 αx
ρg −ρr −ρpiβαpi 0 αx

(3.28)
Γ2 =
1
∆

0 0 1− ρpiβ(1− αpi) 0 1− αx
0 0 ρx + ρpiβ(1− αpi) + ρpiψ + ρg 0 (1− αx)(ρpiψ + ρg + ρx)
0 0 ψ + β(1 + ρg + ρx)(1− αpi) 0 ψ(1− αx)
0 0 1− ρpiβ(1− αpi) 0 1− αx
0 0 1− ρpiβ(1− αpi) 0 1− αx

(3.29)
It is worth noting that economic reasoning attaches positive values to all pa-
rameters appearing in the solvability condition, implying that it is always
satisfied for economically meaningful systems.
Perceived law of motion. Since some of the key variables in our model
are unobservable, we prefer the model consistent forecasts over the simple
VAR approach, which would require either observability of all variables or
an appropriate approximation of them in a first step. The model consistent
approach requires the sequential estimation of the DSGE model over all rel-
evant subsamples. The high dimensionality of the parameter vector requires
a sufficiently long sample to infer precise estimates, so as shortest subsample
we choose the period 1948:2 − −1980:1. In the terminology of the previous
section, we thus choose t0 = 1980:1 and T = 2003:1. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
evolution of agents’ beliefs about the deep parameters over time; it contains
the estimates plotted versus the end point of the subsample, so e.g. the point
(1985, 3.8 × 10−3) in the bottom right panel indicates that the estimate for
the monetary policy shock’s standard deviation was 0.0038 for the 1948–1985
subsample. As expected, the recursive estimates display substantial time vari-
ation so therefore the forecast models that feed back into the model via the
expectations terms introduce a high degree of time variation in the reduced
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form–or actual law of motion’s–parameters. One might suspect that this ac-
counts at least for part of the instability results documented by Ireland over
the two subsamples presented in his paper. The perceived law of motion of any
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Figure 3.1: Perceived deep parameters over time
given date t is then obtained by plugging the corresponding estimates into the
log–linearized system equations (3.27) and solving this structural form equa-
tion for the implied rational expectations equilibrium using Klein’s method.
This yields a dynamic system of the form (3.8), which agents would use as
real–time forecast model for the given date. This sequence of time–varying
PLMs is entirely determined by the data and will not be influenced by the
following estimation procedure.
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Estimating Ireland’s model under Adaptive Learning. For any pa-
rameter vector Ψ, equations (3.27) give a structural form that maps agents
beliefs onto actual dynamic outcomes as indicated by the T–map in (3.10).
We do not want to determine the fixed point, however, since we do not as-
sume agents to use the forecast model consistent with the parameter vector
under consideration, but instead use their real–time perceptions given by the
sequence of PLMs. The T–map translates these perceptions onto actual dy-
namic coefficients. It should be noted that the T–map depends on the structure
parameterized by the chosen vector Ψ, and hence for each such vector maps
the PLM sequence onto a time–varying actual law of motion. The likelihood
of this latter system can be evaluated using the time–dependent version of the
Kalman filter, cf. Harvey (2003). We then estimate the deep parameters under
adaptive learning by computing the maximizer Ψ∗ of this likelihood function.
Estimation Results. The two left columns of table 3.1 contrasts the
estimation results for the model under rational expectations with the model
under adaptive learning. We will allow the interest rate smoothing parameter
ρr in the Taylor rule to be estimated from the data while Ireland proposes the
use of a difference rule, thus fixing ρr = 1.
We find that in the RE version of our model, the estimate of the inertial
parameter is indeed close to unity. Reestimating the model with this restric-
tion imposed yields a maximized log–likelihood value being only 0.2 below the
unrestricted value, thus a likelihood ratio test would not reject the null hypoth-
esis of this parameter being unity. The AL estimate, however, is substantially
below one, and the difference in log–likelihood values is 6.1 which implies re-
jection of the null hypothesis at any standard confidence level. Hence, our first
insight from the AL estimation is that we should not fix the inertial Taylor
rule parameter, but estimate it instead, which gives us a value of ρr = 0.8.
The estimate of the labor elasticity in our RE estimation is slightly higher
than Ireland’s, although it remains statistically insignificant. Our AL estimate
is zero right away. This suggests, as discussed by Ireland, that labor is very
inelastic. The model thus transmits preference shocks exclusively via an in-
crease in demand, without any substantial increase in labor and thus supply.
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Sample 1980:1–2003:1 Sample 1980:1–1991:3
Parameter RE Estimates AL Estimates RE Estimates AL Estimates
ω 0.2567 0.0001 0.1724 0.0013
αx 0.0007 0.9813 0.0044 0.8856
∗∗∗
αpi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ρpi 0.5925
∗∗∗ 0.4290∗∗∗ 0.6253∗∗∗ 0.5217∗∗∗
ρg 0.4005
∗∗∗ 0.2178∗∗∗ 0.4445∗∗∗ 0.2949∗∗∗
ρx 0.0951
∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0704∗∗ 0.0000
ρr 0.9902
∗∗∗ 0.7963∗∗∗ 0.9884∗∗∗ 0.8613∗∗∗
ρa 0.9328
∗∗∗ 0.9978∗∗∗ 0.9126∗∗∗ 0.9931∗∗∗
ρe 1.0000
∗∗∗ 1.0000∗∗∗ 0.9999∗∗∗ 1.0000∗∗∗
σa 0.0224
∗∗∗ 0.3257∗∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0000
σe 0.0003
∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
σz 0.0049
∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0109∗∗∗
σr 0.0029
∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗
L 1197.8 1214.8 561.7 570.9
Table 3.1: Estimation results. Estimates that are significant at the 1 percent
level are marked (***), significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels are marked
(**) and (*).
The estimates of the backward looking elements, αx and αpi, are not sig-
nificant. Interestingly though, the point estimate of the persistence in the
output gap equation is close to unity in the AL case. Thus, despite the high
uncertainty surrounding the estimate, it indicates that backward elements are
quite important for the dynamics of the output gap once we allow for imper-
fect information. This contrasts to the RE result which delivers an estimate
of virtually zero.
The estimates of the autoregressive coefficients in the equations for the
shock processes are very similar across the two models, both suggesting high
persistence of the preference and markup shock. The standard deviations of
the shock processes noise terms, however, differ, being larger for the prefer-
ence, markup and technology shock in the AL case at the expense of a lower
monetary policy shock variance.
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The most important observation is that the model under adaptive learning
attains a higher maximized likelihood value than the same model assuming
rational expectations. The log–likelihood of the AL model, LAL,full = 1214.8
with the subindex indicating the use of the full sample, exceeds its RE coun-
terpart, LRE,full = 1197.8, by 17 points, which is a substantial increase. Un-
fortunately, as neither method nests the other as a special case, or could in any
way be parameterized, no formal test can be applied to judge the statistical
significance of this difference in likelihood.
The first thing to notice is that, again, the likelihood attained for the
AL model, LAL,1 = 570.9 with the subindex 1 indicating the use of the first
half of the sample, exceeds the value of the RE estimation, LRE,1 = 561.7.
Thus adaptive learning consistently yields a superior fit to the data. The
backward looking component in the output gap equation is again very high and
unlike in our previous estimation, where it was found to be insignificant with
a nevertheless high t–statistic of 1.5, this term is now significant, reassuring
our previous finding of the importance of this term.
To formally assess the issue of parameter stability, we also compute the
maximized log–likelihood values of both models for the 1991:4–2003:1 subsam-
ple. These are given by LAL,2 = 663.8 and LRE,2 = 659.5. We use Andrews
and Fair’s (1988) likelihood ratio test which contrasts the log–likelihood over
the two unrestricted subsamples with that of the restricted estimation,
(3.30) LR = 2(L·,1 + L·,2 − L·,full)
With our results this test statistic values 39.8 and 46.8 for the AL and RE
model, respectively. The asymptotic distribution of this statistic is chi–square
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, that is the num-
ber of parameters allowed to vary between subsamples, i.e. our 13 variables
contained in Ψ. Although the AL model yields a lower test statistic, favoring
the idea of less time variation in the AL model, both tests decisively reject
the null hypothesis of parameter stability. Thus even with learning dynamics
accounted for by our method, the data still contains evidence for structural
change. At this point we should note that under adaptive learning there is
another important aspect that should be taken account of: our modelling
strategy was to describe monetary policy with an ad hoc rule. In particular,
89
this rule will not change as the policymaker learns about the economy, while
agents are allowed to change their forecasting rules accordingly. It appears
plausible to model learning as two–sided in the sense that we also allow for
policymakers adjusting their behavior in face of changing beliefs on the dynam-
ics of the economy. This would imply that the policy rule used by the central
bank would be an optimal response to the real–time estimate of the economic
system, and therefore change over time as well. Hence our result points at the
need to model learning as a two–sided process being both relevant for keeping
track of updated forecasting models by forward looking agents but also for
the optimal behavior of policymakers who revise their optimal plans in face of
changes in the economy.
Ireland proposes a decomposition of the variances of the endogenous vari-
ables into parts attributable to each of our four shocks. The endogenous vari-
ables, output growth g, inflation pi, the interest rate r and the output gap
x, relate to the state vector s via the relation yt = Cst with an appropriate
matrix C, while the state equation st+1 = Ast + Bεt+1 implies a solution for
the state vector k periods ahead of
(3.31) st+k =
∑
j≥0
AjBεt+k−j.
Applying the date–t conditional expectations operator and subtracting the
result from the above term yields the k–period forecast error
(3.32) st+k − Etst+k =
k−1∑
j=0
AjBεt+k−j
and hence the k–step ahead forecast error variances
(3.33) Σsk = E(st+k − Etst+k)(st+k − Etst+k)′ =
k−1∑
j=0
AjBV B′Aj′
From the state equation it follows that the unconditional variances Σs solve
the Lyapunov equation
(3.34) Σs = AΣsA′ +BV B′.
The variances of the endogenous variables y then follow as Σd· = CΣ
s
·C
′. V is
the covariance matrix of our four independent shock terms, V = diag(σ2a, σ
2
e ,
σ2z , σ
2
r). The variances due to a single shock are computed by replacing this
matrix by a diagonal matrix containing only the variance of the corresponding
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shock. Since all terms are linear, this yields a decomposition into four terms
each containing the part of the overall variance due to a particular shock.
Table 3.2 presents the contributions of the corresponding variance terms in
the rational expectations model at horizons k = 1, 4, 8, 12, 20, 40,∞ in percent-
age terms. Output growth is mainly affected by shocks to preferences. About
50 percent are due to this source while the policy shock contributes to about
a third of the overall variance and the technology to roughly 16 percent. The
effect of all shocks remains approximately constant across all forecast horizons.
Inflation is affected at short horizons mainly by the cost–push shock, which
initially contributes 58 percent but becomes more important in the long run
resulting in being the dominant factor in the unconditional variance. The pres-
ence of a near unit root, however, makes the unconditional results difficult to
compare, so we also focus on our finite long–term horizon forecast k = 40. At
short horizons the policy shock and to a lesser extend the technology shocks
are also important, injecting 29 percent and 13 percent of the overall one–step
ahead variance. These contributions decrease as the long term variances are
more and more affected by the cost–push shock, resulting in minor contribu-
tions of these two shocks, both effects being exceeded by that of the preference
shock which contributes to 7 percent for k = 40. The interest rate is affected
mainly by the preference shock in the short run, accounting for 85 percent of
the overall variance. With an increasing forecast horizon the cost–push shock
becomes more and more important, accounting for 47 percent of our long term
variance measure. The preference shock remains the major factor with a long
term contribution of 51 percent. However, the unconditional variance is again
dominated by the cost push shock. The variance of the output gap is initially
mainly due to the monetary policy shock and the technology shock, their con-
tributions being 62 and 28 percent, respectively. The preference shock plays
almost no role except for an initial five percent contribution that quickly fades
out at longer horizons, as also do the two aforementioned shock, leaving room
for the cost–push shock to become more and more important and resulting in
a 92 percent contribution in the long term.
Table 3.3 presents the corresponding results for the model under adaptive
learning. Interestingly, the preference and policy shocks play only a minor
role for all variables. The variance of output growth is initially due to the
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technology shock with 53 percent and the cost–push with 41 percent shock.
The impact of the latter increases to 85 percent in the long run reserving
approximately the rest of the variance to the technology shock. The variances
of inflation and the interest rate are dominated at all horizons by the cost–push
shock. While both the technology and the policy shock exert almost no effect
on the overall variance, the preference shock accounts for 3 and 8 percent at
long horizons, respectively. The output gap is also dominated by the cost–push
shock, although at short horizons, for k = 1, 4, the technology shock accounts
for about 11–12 percent and the policy shock for about 9–10 percent.
3.6. Conclusions
This paper developed a general method to estimate DSGE models under
the assumption of either rational expectations or alternatively adaptive learn-
ing. The latter explicitly takes account of the accumulation of information
that gives agents a better understanding of the economy over time. Rational
expectations can be interpreted as a special case of this imperfect knowledge
approach where agents at each point knew the full sample estimates and used
them for their forecasting procedures. However, adaptive learning does not
offer additional degrees of freedom, but is a device that models agents per-
ceptions. In the standard case the perceptions are assumed to coincide with
those implied by the full sample model whereas the general AL case keeps
tracks of agents’ growing information set. The difference of both methods lies
in the modelling of agents’ forecasting model, which corresponds to the correct
model given all information even at early stages where this information is not
yet available in the RE case and the use of real–time models that change over
time reflecting the growing knowledge over time in the AL case. Thus the RE
method implicitly inserts the full sample forecast model into the expectations
side of the model at any point in time whereas the AL method inserts the
forecast model that an econometrician would recommend at a certain point
in time given all available information. Since there are no more degrees of
freedom, just a different sequence of forecast models, it is a priori unknown
which of these approaches gives a better fit to the data. However, we find
that the AL approach dominates the RE approach in terms of the maximized
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likelihood and conclude that the AL estimates offer a superior description of
actual economic relations.
While some estimates qualitatively agree, we find that many key parame-
ters are substantially different among the two different methods. A particularly
important finding is that the backward looking term in the demand equation
turns out to be very high implying that forward looking elements in the equa-
tion determining the output gap are not important, but instead that the gap
is characterized by high structural persistence. This result clearly opposes
the findings from the rational expectations model which come to the opposite
conclusion.
As regards the assessment of the role of technology shocks, our results sug-
gest that all shock terms are important, since all estimated standard deviations
are highly significant. Quantitatively though, as demonstrated by the variance
decompositions, the assessment of the importance of our four shocks differs for
both methods.
In the RE model each shock has its role. While the cost–push shock is the
dominant force except for the variance of output growth, to which the main
contribution stems from preference shocks, policy shocks are important for the
output gap, output growth and inflation, at least in the short term. Preference
shocks are also important for variations in the interest rate. The effect of
the technology shock, however, that contributes to output gap variability, to
some extend also to output growth, and little to the inflation rate, is always
dominated by at least one of the other shocks at any forecast horizon. Thus
while technology shocks do have some explanatory power they are identified
as the least important source of variation.
In the AL model the judgment is different. In this model preference shock
exerts almost no effect at all, and to a lesser extend this holds also true for the
monetary policy shock. Under adaptive learning, thus, we find that besides
the important cost–push shock the only other influential source of volatility is
the technology shock.
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Quarters Preference Cost–Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
Output Growth
1 53.6 1.9 15.5 29.0
4 48.4 3.6 16.3 31.4
8 48.3 4.0 16.3 31.4
12 48.5 4.0 16.3 31.3
20 48.7 4.0 16.2 31.1
40 48.8 3.9 16.2 31.1
∞ 48.8 3.9 16.2 31.1
Inflation
1 1.5 57.5 12.8 28.2
4 6.0 65.4 9.0 19.7
8 9.7 69.7 6.4 14.2
12 10.7 72.8 5.2 11.3
20 10.0 77.9 3.8 8.4
40 6.8 85.7 2.4 5.2
∞ 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Interest Rate
1 84.7 3.2 3.8 8.3
4 84.3 9.0 2.1 4.6
8 79.9 15.7 1.4 3.0
12 75.3 21.2 1.1 2.4
20 67.0 30.3 0.8 1.9
40 51.2 46.9 0.6 1.4
∞ 0.3 99.7 0.0 0.0
Output Gap
1 5.1 4.1 28.4 62.4
4 2.8 32.5 20.2 44.5
8 1.8 60.4 11.8 26.0
12 1.4 72.3 8.0 17.6
20 0.9 83.6 4.8 10.6
40 0.5 91.7 2.4 5.3
∞ 0.5 91.7 2.4 5.3
Table 3.2: Variance decomposition for the RE results.94
Quarters Preference Cost–Push Technology Policy
Ahead Shock Shock Shock Shock
Output Growth
1 2.2 40.5 52.5 4.9
4 1.1 74.7 21.9 2.4
8 0.7 84.6 13.1 1.6
12 0.7 84.9 12.8 1.6
20 0.7 84.9 12.8 1.6
40 0.7 84.9 12.8 1.6
∞ 0.7 84.9 12.8 1.6
Inflation
1 0.7 98.1 0.7 0.6
4 1.0 97.5 0.8 0.7
8 1.2 97.2 0.9 0.7
12 1.4 97.1 0.9 0.7
20 1.8 96.8 0.8 0.7
40 2.5 96.1 0.8 0.6
∞ 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.0
Interest Rate
1 1.0 98.1 0.5 0.4
4 1.5 97.9 0.3 0.2
8 2.5 96.8 0.4 0.3
12 3.3 95.9 0.4 0.3
20 4.7 94.6 0.4 0.3
40 7.6 91.7 0.4 0.3
∞ 0.3 99.7 0.0 0.0
Output Gap
1 3.8 75.7 11.3 9.1
4 4.3 73.2 12.4 10.1
8 0.4 97.4 1.2 1.0
12 0.2 99.0 0.4 0.4
20 0.1 99.6 0.2 0.2
40 0.0 99.8 0.1 0.1
∞ 0.0 99.8 0.1 0.1
Table 3.3: Variance decomposition for the AL results.95

Concluding Remarks
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the empirical relevance of the
adaptive learning approach. This method has experienced a recent boom cul-
minating in a line of research that analyzes stability of systems under imperfect
knowledge. The focus in on deriving conditions for policy that assure that ad-
ditional dynamics resulting from the learning propagation mechanism fade out
over time and imply convergence of economic systems to a perfect information,
rational expectations equilibrium.
There is, however, little empirical treatment of this topic. Were the afore-
mentioned dynamic propagation mechanism quantitatively negligible, the re-
lated convergence result would not appear to be relevant. We therefore assessed
the role of adaptive learning in important empirical applications and tried to
analyze the contribution of this approach to explaining phenomena in time
series data.
Our first chapter showed how the assumption of adaptive learning endo-
genizes policy behavior, thus being able to explain changes in the stance of
monetary policy that occurred e.g. in the US during the early 1980s under
the tenure of Paul Volcker. These changes are usually traced back to exoge-
nous forces such as the change in chairmanship of the Fed. The standard view
that policy has not been conducted optimally must be modified. Indeed, we
saw that taking account of adaptive learning completely explains the different
stance in policy with inflation becoming a primary concern of central bankers
in an environment under imperfect knowledge, since the beliefs of key param-
eters change substantially and imply a revision of the way policy is conducted.
Our findings thus suggest that any policymaker would by the early 1980s have
learned to behave in the way we observed in the history of US monetary policy,
while conversely in the seventies any policymaker would have conducted policy
in a way that would nowadays be criticized for having been non–optimal. This
is an interesting result since this implies an equivalent change in policy for
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both the US and the UK economy, a feature that the change in chairmanship
alone cannot address.
Our analysis revealed that historic interest rate decisions are highly corre-
lated with optimal rates, but that even a policymaker under imperfect informa-
tion would have reacted stronger towards the rise in inflation in the 1970s. On
the other hand, policymaking in the last 25 years is consistent with an optimiz-
ing but learning policymaker. Policy reactions in the US and particularly in
the UK until the early 1980s appear conservative related to recommendations
of an optimizing decision maker. However, as the uncertainty surrounding the
estimates of the model is initially high and substantially declines at the same
time, we conjecture that accounting for uncertainty in the sense of Brainard
is a key factor in policy setting.
We pursued this idea in the second chapter where the main focus is on
the inflation–unemployment performance in an economy with an adaptively
learning policymaker. Despite him behaving optimally the fact that his infor-
mation set is limited almost inevitably leads the economy into great inflation
like episodes. We find all characteristics that are observed in US and UK time
series to be generated by model simulations under learning. These include the
substantial revisions in perceived inflation persistence and the strong underes-
timation of the natural rate of unemployment in the late 1960s and 1970s. Fur-
thermore, a Brainard–type policymaker will acknowledge the high uncertainty
of econometric estimates until the early 1980s and if he acts in a conservative
manner as advocated by Brainard, we consistently recover paths of inflation
and unemployment as experienced in the US and the UK. We conclude that the
adaptive learning hypothesis is capable of explaining important historic facts
that are otherwise difficult to account for, and that in the empirical analysis
uncertainty plays a central role.
Given the empirical relevance of the concept as documented in the two
previous chapters, the third chapter developed a method that allows to esti-
mate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models under adaptive learning,
replacing the assumption of rational expectations. We applied this approach
to a version of the New Keynesian model. We found firstly, that the estima-
tion results under the assumption of adaptive learning give a better fit to the
data then under that of rational expectations, and secondly, that key results
98
are substantially different under both methods. We concluded that the strong
assumption of perfect knowledge which is implicit in the rational expectations
framework introduces a bias into the estimation results.
To summarize, the adaptive learning approach has proven to be a powerful
and empirically relevant tool, implementing an informationally plausible alter-
native, or extension, to the rational expectations hypothesis. We investigated
the effect of the adaptive learning assumptions in important models of the
economy and discussed how the standard assumption of rational expectations
can be modified to account for the role of learning related dynamics. Models
estimated under imperfect knowledge give a better fit to the data and reveal
important insights otherwise masked by the rigid full information setup. We
found robust evidence for the importance of adaptive learning with a particular
emphasis on parameter uncertainty, the latter having not yet been taken ac-
count of in the related literature. It also turned out that estimation procedures
involving the extraction of unobservable components emphasize a substantial
role of misperceptions in these variables. Importantly, unlike knowledge on
structural parameters, latent variables will always remain a source of uncer-
tainty which can lead to suboptimal outcomes over and over again.
Although we investigated the impact of imperfect knowledge on optimal
policy and on forecasting procedures in isolation, our results suggest that both
channels are important and thus should be jointly analyzed. Thus, empirical
analysis of models under adaptive learning should proceed by modelling learn-
ing as a two–sided process giving an important role to optimal policy decisions
and appropriate forecast models under imperfect knowledge. Furthermore, the
role of uncertainty of beliefs should be taken into consideration, since moder-
ate behavior played an important role in the outbreak of the great inflation in
the US and the UK.
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Appendix
A.1. Recursive least squares and constant gain algorithms
We will discuss the relation of ordinary least squares, its recursive represen-
tation and constant gain algorithms (CGA) which are popular in the adaptive
learning literature. As discussed in the text, constant gain algorithms are ob-
tained from recursive least squares by replacing the decreasing gain factor by
an appropriate constant; the literature has reached a consensus on the relevant
range for this parameter and agrees on particular values. However, CGAs are
recursive representations of the discounted least squares formula. Since the
latter rarely appears in related work, we recall its definition
Definition 1. The discounted least squares estimator for discount factor
δ ≤ 1 of a vector of t observations y on the t×k regressor matrix x is given by
the ordinary least squares estimator of the regression of ∆y on ∆x, where ∆ =
diag(δt−1, δt−2, . . . , δ1, δ0) is a diagonal matrix with geometrically increasing
entries.
Lemma 1. Versions of the ordinary least squares estimator in the regression
of the t–dimensional endogenous variable y on x are given by
βt = (X
′∆2X)−1X ′∆2y =
( t∑
i=1
δ2(t−i)xix′i
)−1( t∑
i=1
δ2(t−i)xiyi
)
(A.1)
The following equations are the corresponding recursive representation,
βt = βt−1 + γtΣ−1t x
′
t(yt − xtβt)(A.2a)
Σt = Σt−1 + γt(xtx′t − Σt−1).(A.2b)
For δ = 1 and γ = 1/t, these equations yield the ordinary least squares esti-
mator and its recursive version. If we choose an arbitrary δ, equations (A.1)
101
become discounted least squares, and an equivalent representation is given by
formulae (A.2) if we choose γ = 1− δ2.
The least squares formula (A.1) is of course well known and is stated here
only for completeness. Similarly, the discounted least squares version is a direct
consequence of the definition. Only the equivalence of the recursive formula-
tions to their non–recursive counterparts remains to be shown, in particular
the relation of the discount factor and the gain parameter.
We are interested in terms of the form ct = R
−1
t St, where both Rt and St are
scaled sums, as in equation (A.1), and thus allow for recursive representations.
To be concrete, we write Rt = γαt
∑t
i=1 gi and St = γαt
∑t
i=1 hi. We focus
on Rt first. After isolating the last summation term and factoring out αt/αt−1
in the remaining sum, we can substitute in Rt−1 to obtain the recursion Rt =
αt/αt−1Rt−1 + γαtgt.ii
Under either condition
(i) 1− αt/αt−1 = γαt
or (ii) 1− αt/αt−1 = γ,
we can deduce one of the more common terms for Rt − Rt−1 (by subtracting
Rt−1 from both sides of our recursion), namely γαt(gt − Rt−1) and γ(αtgt −
Rt−1), respectively.
Using similar steps and substituting in the corresponding formula for ct−1,
we can rewrite St = αt/αt−1Rt−1ct−1 + γαtht. Collecting results and us-
ing footnote (ii), we finally arrive at the familiar updating term ct − ct−1 =
γαtR
−1
t (ht − gtct−1).
To obtain versions of the least squares formula, we set gi = δ
−2ixix′i, hi =
δ−2ixiyi. The choice δ = 1, αt = 1/t, and γ = 1 yields ordinary least squares,
that is R−1t St corresponds to equation (A.1). Since these coefficients satisfy the
first condition, we obtain the recursive least squares formulae, i.e. equations
(A.2) with gain factor 1/t. For arbitrary positive δ < 1, the choice αt = δ
2t
and γ = 1 − δ2, yields discounted least squares with discount factor δ, i.e.
equation (A.1) for arbitrary discount factor. Since these parameters satisfy
iiThis equation implies αt/αt−1R−1t Rt−1 = I− γαtR−1t gt.
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the second condition, we obtain the constant gain algorithm with gain 1− δ2
as recursive representation, as in equations (A.2).
A.2. State space form of the dynamic program
We set
(A.3) yt = (pit, pit−1, pit−2, pit−3, ut, ut−1, 1, u∗t , u
∗
t−1, Vt−1)
′
the dynamic program is given by
max−
∑
t≥s
δt−s[y′tΩyyyt + u
′
tΩuuut + 2y
′
tΩyuut](A.4)
s.t.(A.5)
yt = Ayt−1 +But(A.6)
where
A =

α1 α2 0 0 θ1 θ2 cpi −θ1 −θ2 0
I3 03×3 03×2 03×2
−λ/4 −λ/4 −λ/4
0 0 0
−λ/4 ρ1 ρ2
0 1 0
cu 1− ρ1
0 0
−ρ2 0
0 0
02×3 02×3 I2 02×2
02×3 02×3 0 10 0 02×2

,(A.7)
B = (0, 0, 0, 0, λ, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)′,(A.8)
and
(A.9) Ω =
(
Ωyy Ωyu
Ωyu′ Ωuu
)
consisting of the block matrices
(A.10) Ωyy =

1 −pi∗
−pi∗ 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0
ωx −κωx
−κωx κ2ωx 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ωu

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Ωuu = ωu,(A.11)
and
Ωyu = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−ωuu)′(A.12)
A.3. Solution strategy
Our problem is to choose a sequence {vt}t≥0 to minimize
(A.13)
∑
t
βt[x′tRxt + 2x
′
tWut + u
′
tQut]
subject to the linear transition law
(A.14) xt+1 = Axt +But + εt+1
where we adopt the notation of Hansen and Sargent (2004) to facilitate com-
parison. First, we note the well known result that the solution is given by
ut = −Fxt, which is also established in the aforementioned monograph, with
F given by
(A.15) F = (Q+ βB′PB)−1(βB′PA+W ′)
Solving the policymaker’s problem thus reduced to computing the matrix P ,
which is known to satisfy the algebraic Riccati equation
(A.16) P = R + βA′PA− (βA′PB +W )(Q+ βB′PB)−1(βB′PA+W ′)
We will apply an efficient routine provided by Evan W. Anderson.iii This
method is designed for undiscounted optimal linear regulator problems without
mixed terms, so several transformations as suggested by Hansen and Sargent
are in order. We set
A∗ =
√
β(A−BQ−1W ′)(A.17a)
B∗ =
√
βB(A.17b)
R∗ = R−WQ−1W ′(A.17c)
Q∗ = Q(A.17d)
iiiThe matlab file schurgaux is available on his website
http://www.math.niu.edu/∼anderson.
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and verify by inserting the matrices that our above system is equivalent to the
undiscounted problem without mixed terms under certainty,
(A.18)
∑
t
[xˆ′tR
∗xˆt + vˆ′tQ
∗vˆt]
subject to
(A.19) xˆt+1 = A
∗xˆt +B∗vˆt
This system gives rise to a corresponding Riccati equation in P ∗,
(A.20) P ∗ = R∗ + A∗′P ∗A∗ − A∗′P ∗B∗(Q∗ +B∗′P ∗B∗)−1B∗′P ∗A∗.
Conveniently, the solution to the latter Riccati equation coincides with the one
in our original problem, a fact we capture in
Lemma 2. The Riccati matrix of our original problem (xx) coincides with
the Riccati matrix of the transformed system, P = P ∗.
Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Hansen and Sargent (2005) show how the
problem (A.18) and (A.19), and thus implicitly equation (A.20), can be solved
using a deflating subspace method. This involves computing the ordered gen-
eralized real Schur decomposition of the matrix pencil λL−N, λ ∈ C with
(A.21) L =
(
In B
∗Q∗−1B∗′
0n A
∗′
)
, N =
(
A∗ 0n
−R∗ In
)
.
Anderson’s routine is designed to compute this decomposition, associated with
our transformed problem. It yields a matrix, which after partitioning into
2 × 2 equally sized submatrices Uij, i, j = 1, 2, let’s us deduce the Riccati
matrix P = U21U
−1
11 , and thus from lemma 2 the Riccati matrix of our original
problem, which is then subsequently used to infer the optimal policy from
equation (A.15).
It just remains us to provide the proof of our lemma, which is done by
substituting the transformed system’s matrices (A.17) into the original Riccati
equation (A.16) and investigating each of the three terms on the right hand
side of the above equation separately.
The first only requires substitution of R,
(A.22) R = R∗ +WQ−1W ′,
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the second term becomes the second term becomes
βA′PA
=β(β−1/2(A∗ +B∗Q−1W ′))′P (β−1/2(A∗ +B∗Q−1W ′))
=[A∗′ +WQ−1B∗′]P [A∗ +B∗Q−1W ′]
=A∗′PA∗ + A∗′PB∗Q−1W ′ +WQ−1B∗′PA∗ +WQ−1B∗′PB∗Q−1W ′.(A.23)
Tedious computations are necessary for the third term. We start with the
last two of its three factors, and use the shorthand notationM ≡ (Q+B∗′PB∗):
M−1[B∗′P (A∗ +B∗Q−1W ′) +W ′]
= M−1[B∗′PA∗ + (B∗′PB∗ +Q)Q−1W ′]
= M−1[B∗′PA∗ +MQ−1W ′] = M−1B∗′PA∗ +Q−1W ′
Hence
[(A∗′ +WQ−1B∗′)PB∗ +W ]×M−1[B∗′P (A∗ +B∗Q−1W ′) +W ′]
= [A∗′PB∗ +WQ−1(Q+B∗′PB∗)]× [M−1B∗′PA∗ +Q−1W ′]
= A∗′PB∗M−1B∗′PA∗ + A∗′PB∗Q−1W ′ +WQ−1B∗′PA∗
+WQ−1B∗′PB∗Q−1W ′ +WQ−1W ′(A.24)
The second term of (A.24) cancels with the second of (A.23) and similarly
the third and fourth terms cancel. The fifth term cancels with the second in
(A.22). Collecting the remaining terms, which are the first expressions of each
separate term, we obtain
(A.25) P = R∗ + A∗′PA∗ − A∗′PB∗(Q+B∗′PB∗)−1B∗′PA∗
Hence, the Riccati matrix of the untransformed system also satisfies the Riccati
equation of the transformed system (A.20), thus from the uniqueness of this
matrix we deduce P = P ∗ as was to be shown.
106
Bibliography
Andrews, Donald W. K. and Ray C. Fair (1988): “Inference in Nonlinear
Econometric Models with Structural Change.” Review of Economic Studies ,
55:615–639.
Ball, Laurence and N. Gregory Mankiw (2002): “The NAIRU in Theory and
Practice.” Working Paper .
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon (1983): “Rules, discretion and rep-
utation in a model of monetary policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics ,
12:101–121.
Batini, Nicoletta and Jennifer V. Greenslade (2006): “Measuring the UK short-
run NAIRU.” Oxford Economic Papers , 58:28–49.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Charles M. Kahn (1980): “The Solution of Linear
Difference Models under Rational Expectations.” Econometrica, 48:1305–
1311.
Blinder, Alan S. (1997): “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government:
What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics–And Vice Versa.” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives , 11:3–19.
Brainard, William (1967): “Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy.” Amer-
ican Economic Review , 57:411–425.
Bullard, James and Stefano Eusepi (2005): “Did the Great Inflation Occur
Despite Policymaker Commitment to a Taylor Rule?” Review of Economic
Dynamics , 8:324–359.
Bullard, James and Kaushik Mitra (2002): “Learning about Monetary Policy
Rules.” Journal of Monetary Economics , 49:1105–1129.
Calvo, Guillermo A. (1983): “Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Frame-
work.” Journal of Monetary Economics , 12:382–398.
Cho, In-Koo, Noah Williams and Thomas J. Sargent (2002): “Escaping Nash
Inflation.” Review of Economic Studies , 69:1–40.
107
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans (1997):
“Sticky price and limited participation models of money: A comparison.”
European Economic Review , 41:1201–1249.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans (1999):
“Monetary Policy Shocks: What have we learned and to what end?” In Tay-
lor, John B. and Michael Woodford, editors, Handbook of Macroeconomics,
Volume 1 , pages 65–148. Elsevier Science B.V.
Christiano, Lawrence J. and Christopher J. Gust (1999): “Taylor Rules in a
Limited Participation Model.” NBER Working Paper , 7017.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal´ı and Mark Gertler (2000): “Monetary Policy Rules
and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Theory.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics , 115:147–180.
Cogley, Timothey and Thomas J. Sargent (2001): “Evolving Post-World War
II U.S. Inflation Dynamics.” NBER Macroeconomic Annual , pages 331–373.
Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (2001): Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics . Frontiers of Economic Research. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Franz, Wolfgang (2005): “Will the (German) NAIRU Please Stand Up?” Ger-
man Economic Review , 6:131–153.
Fuhrer, Jeff and George Moore (1995): “Inflation Persistence.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics , 110:127–59.
Gerlach, Stefan and Lars E. O. Svensson (2003): “Money and Inflation in
the Euro Area: A Case for Monetary Indicators?” Journal of Monetary
Economics , 50:1649–1672.
Goodfriend, Marvin (1993): “Interest Rate Policy and the Inflation Scare
Problem: 1979–1992.” FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly , 79.
Gordon, Robert J. (1997): “The Time-Varying NAIRU and Its Implications
for Economic Policy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives , 11:11–32.
Greenslade, Jennifer V., Richard G. Pierse and Jumana Saleheen (2003): “A
Kalman filter approach to estimating the UK NAIRU.” Bank of England
Working Paper .
Hamilton, James D. (1994): Time Series Analysis . Princeton University Press.
Hansen, Lars Peter and Thomas J. Sargent (2004): Recursive Models of Dy-
namic Linear Economies . Monograph.
108
Hansen, Lars Peter and Thomas J. Sargent (2005): Misspecification in Recur-
sive Macroeconomic Theory . Monograph.
Harvey, Andrew C. (1993): Time Series Models . MIT Press, 2nd edition.
Harvey, Andrew C. (2003): Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and
the Kalman Filter . Cambridge Universtiy Press.
Hodrick, Robert J. and Edward C. Prescott (1997): “Postwar U.S. Business
Cycles: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing , 29:1–16.
Ireland, Peter N. (2003): “Irrational expectations and econometric practice:
discussion of Orphanides and Williams, ‘Inflation scares and forecast-based
monetary policy’.” Working Paper 2003–22, Federal Reserve Bank of At-
lanta.
Ireland, Peter N. (2004): “Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model.”
The Review of Economics and Statistics , 86:923–936.
Junker, Simon (2008): “Adaptive Learning in the Empirical Analysis.” Work-
ing Paper .
Kalman, Rudolf E. (1960): “A new Approach to Linear Filtering and Predic-
tive Problems.” Transactions ASME, Journal of basic engineering , pages
34–45.
Klein, Paul (2000): “Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate
linear rational expectations model.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control , 24:1405–1423.
Kreps, David (1998): “Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice.” In Jacobs,
Donald P., Ehud Kalai, Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, edi-
tors, Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory , pages 242–274. Cambridge
University Press.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1972): “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money.”
Journal of Economic Theory , 4. 103–124.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1976): “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.” In
Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy . North–Holland.
Milani, Fabio (2005): “Adaptive learning and inflation persistence.” Working
Paper .
Muth, John F. (1961): “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Move-
ments.” Econometrica, 29:315–335.
109
Okun, Arthur (1962): “Potential Output: Its Measurement and Significance.”
American Statistical Association 1962 Proceedings of the Business and Eco-
nomic Section.
Orphanides, Athanasios (2002): “Monetary Policy Rules and the Great Infla-
tion.” FRS Working Paper .
Orphanides, Athanasios and Simon van Norden (2002): “The Unreliability
of Output–Gap Estimates in Real Time.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics , 84:569–583.
Orphanides, Athanasios and John C. Williams (2005): “The Decline of Activist
Stabilization Policy: Natural Rate Misperceptions, Learning, and Expecta-
tions.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 29:1927–1950.
Orphanides, Athanasios and John C. Williams (2007): “Robust monetary pol-
icy with imperfect knowledge.” Journal of Monetary Economics , 54:1406–
1435.
Primiceri, Giorgio (2006): “Why Inflation Rose and Fell: Policymakers’ Beliefs
and US Postwar Stabilization Policy.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
121:867–901.
Rotemberg, Julio J. (1982): “Sticky Prices in the United States.” Journal of
Political Economy , 90:1187–1211.
Rudebusch, Glenn D. and Lars E. O. Svensson (1998): “Policy Rules for Infla-
tion Targeting.” NBER Working Papers 6512, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Sack, Brian (2000): “Does the fed act gradually? A VAR analysis.” Journal
of Monetary Economics , 46:229–256.
Schorfheide, Frank (2005): “Learning and Monetary Policy Shifts.” Review of
Economic Dynamics , 8:392–419.
Sims, Christopher A (2002): “Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models.”
Computational Economics , 20:1–20.
Smets, Frank (2002): “Output Gap Uncertainty: Does it matter for the Taylor
Rule?” Empirical Economics , 27:113–129.
Taylor, John B. (1993): “Discretion versus policy rules in practice.” Carnegie–
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy , 39:195–214.
Taylor, John B. (1999): “How the Rational Expectations Revolution Has
Changed Macroeconomic Policy Research.” Lecture presented at the 12th
110
World Congress of the International Economic Association.
Uhlig, Harald (1995): “A toolkit for analyzing nonlinear dynamic stochastic
models easily.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Discussion Paper 101 .
Woodford, Michael (2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of
Monetary Policy . Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
111
